Greenland developed for military bases is absolutely necessary for the US as a major deterrent to russia and china

1. Why Greenland matters: geography, bases and the Arctic opening

Greenland’s location at the nexus of North America, Europe and the High North gives it outsized value for missile warning, space surveillance and control of northern sea approaches, and the United States already operates the Pituffik Space Base there, a longstanding node for missile-warning and satellite command and control ^{[1] [4] [2]}. The Arctic is warming and opening shipping lanes and access to minerals—rare earths and other deposits—that add an economic strategic layer to military considerations and draw Beijing and Moscow into the region in different ways ^{[4] [3] [5]}.

2. What building out bases in Greenland would buy the United States

Expanding U.S. basing or "total access" in Greenland could improve early warning, sensor coverage and the geographic depth of missile-defence architectures—arguments advanced by U.S. officials and the Trump administration when framing proposals such as a “Golden Dome” missile-defence augmentation linked to Greenland ^{[6] [2]}. NATO officials and analysts say a larger, permanent allied presence would make planning and rapid response across the Arctic easier, and could be configured to limit Chinese and Russian economic or military footholds in sensitive areas ^{[2] [7]}.

3. Limits to the “absolutely necessary” claim: law, capability and alternatives

The United States already has legal rights and operational options in Greenland under a 1951 bilateral defense agreement (amended later) that enables U.S. bases and activity; commentators note that Washington could increase forces and activity under existing frameworks without seizing territory, undercutting the notion that annexation or wholesale development is indispensable ^{[2] [8]}. Analysts at institutions such as the German Marshall Fund and policy outlets emphasize that Russia has modernized Arctic forces while China’s footprint is primarily scientific and commercial for now—meaning the threat picture is mixed and not reducible to “need bases or else” ^{[3] [9]}.

4. Costs, risks and political realities of developing Greenland heavily

Pursuing large-scale basing, land transfers or annexation carries high diplomatic costs with Denmark, risks fracturing NATO unity (a concern expressed by EU and NATO officials in response to grand U.S. proposals), and could feed the very narratives of Western disunity that Beijing views as opportunities ^{[9] [7]}. Strategic commentators argue that annexation is unnecessary and politically fraught, and that permanent expansion should be weighed against legal sovereignty, Greenlandic autonomy, and transatlantic trust ^{[10] [9]}.

5. A pragmatic middle path and the realistic deterrent calculus

Reporting suggests a more pragmatic approach: leverage the 1951 framework to increase allied posture where needed, invest in Arctic-capable forces and sensors, coordinate NATO deployments and restrictions on foreign investment, and prioritize resilience of existing northern warning architecture rather than dramatic territorial moves—steps that would strengthen deterrence without the geopolitical blowback of annexation ^{[2] [11] [8]}. In short, Greenland developed for bases enhances deterrence materially, but the evidence does not sustain the claim that such development is the only or absolutely necessary path to deter Russia and China; alliances, presence under current agreements, and capabilities investment are viable, lower-cost alternatives that preserve alliances while addressing the Arctic challenge ^{[3] [8]}.