The Gripen E is still the least capable Western fighter in production and costs 30% more

Checked on December 2, 2025
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Executive summary

Claims that the Gripen E is “the least capable Western fighter in production” and “costs 30% more” are not directly supported by the available reporting. Recent primary sources describe the Gripen E as a modern, combat-capable 4.5‑generation fighter with AESA radar, advanced EW and datalinks, and active sales to Brazil, Colombia and other partners [1] [2] [3]. Pricing reports vary widely — independent analyses and market reporting suggest unit‑cost estimates from roughly $145–$250 million depending on scope and country, and some outlets report per‑aircraft figures comparable to Rafale or F‑16V rather than a uniform 30% premium [4] [5] [6].

1. Capability: modern 4.5‑gen, not a one‑line “least capable”

Saab and defense press describe the Gripen E as a major evolution with a GE F414G engine, new AESA radar (Raven ES‑05), IRST, and enhanced EW and datalinking designed for contested environments and networked operations — features that position it as a modern 4.5‑generation multirole fighter rather than an outclassed design [1] [7] [8]. Swedish and industry releases stress modular avionics, short turnaround from rough strips, and human/machine collaboration including AI trials — operational characteristics that go beyond the “least capable” label [9] [10] [11].

2. Comparative judgments exist, but sources disagree

Evaluations differ by mission set and comparator. Some analysts and procurement outcomes favor fifth‑generation types (F‑35) on stealth and sensor fusion, while other outlets and Saab emphasize Gripen’s lower operating cost, rapid turnarounds and easy integration of new weapons as competitive advantages [12] [13]. National procurements (e.g., Canada debate, Norway/others in background) contain opposing judgments: one review cited by media placed F‑35 ahead on “Capability Delivery” while other commentators still argued Gripen offers superior availability and lower hour costs [12] [14]. The record shows disagreement rather than consensus that Gripen E is the “least capable” [12] [13].

3. Price: widely divergent figures, context matters

Recent reporting and market analyses show large variation in apparent unit costs depending on contract scope (airframes, local industry content, weapons, simulators, sustainment). Defence‑Ukraine and French investigative outlets calculate apparent unit prices for Colombia in the range of roughly $182–$250 million apiece when program totals are divided across airframes and support, while other rough estimates cited in reporting put unit prices nearer $145–$228 million in different comparisons [5] [4] [6]. None of the sources provide an authoritative single‑line figure that the Gripen E “costs 30% more” than competitors; instead, they show contract structure and configuration drive big swings in per‑aircraft accounting [5] [6].

4. Operating cost and availability: a contested advantage

Saab and some analyses argue Gripen has among the lowest cost‑per‑flight‑hour and is designed for low logistical footprint, with manufacturer figures and prior studies supporting relative cost‑effectiveness [13] [15]. Other analyses show varied hourly and lifecycle cost comparisons and caution that Saab’s figures often reflect Swedish operating contexts and assumed logistics [15] [14]. In short, operating‑cost claims are supported by manufacturer data and some independent experts but remain contested when comparing across air forces and mission profiles [13] [15].

5. Sales and operational record undercut simple “least capable” narratives

The Gripen E has secured export contracts and deliveries — e.g., deliveries to Brazil, a multi‑aircraft order and accelerating program metrics, and a contract announced with Colombia — indicating active demand and operational acceptance [3] [2] [7]. Reuters and other outlets note Gripen’s strengths for dispersed operations, quick turnaround, and NATO interoperability; those operational attributes contrast with a summary dismissal of capability [16] [17].

6. What the sources don’t say (limitations)

Available sources do not mention any authoritative, single comparative ranking that declares Gripen E “the least capable Western fighter in production” across all mission sets; nor do they provide a universal, verifiable metric proving Gripen costs exactly “30% more” than specified Western rivals. Price and capability assessments vary by country, configuration and mission, and many numbers in public reporting are derived from program totals divided by aircraft counts rather than line‑item contract price disclosures [5] [6].

Bottom line: reporting supports that the Gripen E is a modern, exportable 4.5‑generation fighter with strengths in EW, networking and cost management; price comparisons and capability rankings depend on assumptions, scope and chosen comparator, and the claim that it is the “least capable” or uniformly “30% more expensive” is not substantiated in the provided sources [1] [6] [5].

Want to dive deeper?
How does the gripen e's avionics and sensors compare to rival fighters like the rafale and typhoon?
What factors drive the gripen e's procurement and life-cycle costs despite its smaller size?
Have operators reported performance shortfalls or maintenance issues with the gripen e in service?
How do export deals and political offsets affect the gripen e's competitiveness?
What upgrades or variants could narrow the capability gap between the gripen e and heavier western fighters?