How does the SAAB Gripen E/Radar (ES-05 Raven or AESA) compare to the F-35 AN/APG-81 in range and detection?

1. Different design philosophies: swivel‑scan Gripen vs integrated stealth sensor suite

Saab built the ES‑05 Raven around an AESA mounted on a rotating repositioner (swashplate) to give a 140° search volume within a ~200° look‑angle and allow off‑boresight scanning (including scanning slightly aft), which Saab frames as a tactical advantage for BVR shots and survivability inside contested airspace ^{[1] [6]}. By contrast, the F‑35’s AN/APG‑81 is described by Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin as a core element of a stealthy, tightly integrated sensor‑fusion package delivering long‑range detection, tracking, and EW functions to preserve “first look, first shot, first engagement” in a stealth‑centric concept of operations ^{[4] [3]}.

2. Field of view and tactical implications

Saab emphasizes the Raven’s mechanical repositioner that extends angular coverage beyond a fixed AESA’s forward cone — Saab test pilots highlight 140° search volume enabling side‑and partial‑rear looks without pointing the aircraft at the threat, which Saab argues reduces exposure during BVR engagements ^{[1] [6]}. Sources contrast this with the F‑35 approach of relying on low observability plus an advanced front‑facing AESA and fused passive sensors to achieve situational awareness; reporting does not claim the AN/APG‑81 has a swivel plate ^{[4] [3]}.

3. Range and detection claims — manufacturers versus public reporting

Northrop Grumman and Lockheed say the AN/APG‑81 provides “long‑range” air‑to‑air capability and advanced EW functions, but public materials and press pieces stress capability rather than publish exact detection envelopes ^{[4] [3]}. Saab materials and promotional reporting emphasize the Raven’s long‑range BVR role when combined with Meteor missiles and the aircraft’s EW/IRST fusion, but they too stop short of open, directly comparable radar‑range numbers in the sources provided ^{[2] [7] [6]}.

4. Counter‑stealth and sensor fusion: different routes to the same goal

Multiple sources note Gripen’s package (AESA + IRST + robust EW + data links) is designed to counter anti‑access environments and “counter‑stealth” targets through sensor fusion and EW, not by being a stealth aircraft ^{[6] [7]}. The F‑35 relies on low observability plus the APG‑81’s passive/active modes and integrated suite to detect, track and suppress defenses; manufacturers claim that combination yields superior battlespace awareness ^{[4] [3]}.

5. Independent commentary and tone: varied comparisons, few hard numbers

Defense press and analysts repeatedly compare the two platforms’ sensor philosophies and note the F‑35’s avionics/sensor fusion as a benchmark while crediting the Gripen’s agility, EW and Meteor integration; several pieces state the F‑35’s radar is “more advanced” or larger but often without raw detection‑range data in the available sources ^{[5] [8] [9]}. Forum and enthusiast discussions speculate about T/R‑module counts and power/cooling limits, but these are not authoritative, published performance figures ^[10].

6. What the sources do not provide — key limits to any definitive comparison

Available sources do not publish standardized, peer‑reviewed detection ranges (e.g., detection at defined RCS and altitude) that would allow a direct numeric comparison of ES‑05 vs AN/APG‑81 under identical conditions; instead, reporting provides qualitative claims and platform doctrines ^{[1] [4] [3]}. If you need exact detection envelopes or RCS‑dependent curves, those figures are not present in the supplied material and would typically be classified or vendor‑protected.

7. Practical takeaway for readers and policymakers

Use case matters: Gripen’s Raven + EW/IRST emphasis offers operational flexibility (wide look‑angles, strong passive options) valuable for dispersed, low‑logistics operations; the F‑35’s APG‑81 is described as part of a stealth‑centric, long‑reach sensor fusion suite optimized for “first‑look/first‑shot” in high‑threat environments ^{[1] [4] [3]}. Neither source set supplies an unambiguous numeric winner on raw detection range; decisions should weigh tactics, networked sensors, missiles (e.g., Meteor), and logistics as much as raw radar numbers ^{[2] [7] [5]}.