What are documented test results, published performance figures, or pilot/operator accounts comparing Gripen E/Raven and F-35 radar detection performance?
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Executive summary
Public reporting contains analyst commentary, vendor claims, and enthusiast comparisons but no released, independently verifiable test data directly comparing the Raven ES‑05 (Gripen E) and the F‑35’s radar detection performance. Sources emphasize the F‑35’s lower radar cross‑section (RCS) and superior sensor fusion while describing Gripen E strengths in electronic warfare and an agile, mechanically scanned/swashplate AESA sensor; none publish head‑to‑head, instrumented detection ranges or pilot‑logged radar detection events [1] [2] [3].
1. No public formal test report comparing detection ranges
Available reporting and analyst pieces discuss design choices and capabilities but do not contain a documented, side‑by‑side test report with measured detection ranges, track quality, false‑alarm rates or controlled pilot/operator trial results between the Gripen E’s Raven ES‑05 and the F‑35’s radar: the sources relay capability claims and assessments rather than publishing raw test figures [2] [3] [1].
2. F‑35 advantage: stealth and sensor fusion are repeatedly stressed
Multiple sources state that the F‑35’s low observable design reduces its detectability and that its sensor fusion and situational awareness give it a substantial beyond‑visual‑range edge; these assessments appear across analyst outlets as a key rationale for the F‑35’s detection advantage [1] [4]. Those sources treat the F‑35’s stealth as a primary technical factor in how it outranges or outdetects fourth‑generation fighters.
3. Gripen E strengths: Raven ES‑05, swashplate and digital survivability
Reporting highlights that the Gripen E’s Raven ES‑05 radar is mechanically rotated on a swashplate, giving a larger instantaneous field of regard than fixed‑panel AESAs, and that Saab pairs radar capability with a potent Arexis electronic warfare (EW) suite and IRST to improve detection and survivability; analysts argue this “digital survivability” can materially affect detectability and engagement timelines [2] [3].
4. Conflicting narratives: “not stealthy” vs “digital survivability”
Sources offer divergent frames: some emphasize that the Gripen is conventionally shaped and “more easily detectable” than the F‑35 [1], while others claim advanced EW, GaN‑based systems and swashplate radar give the Gripen E practical detection and defensive advantages that compensate for less physical stealth [5] [2]. This disagreement reflects differing priorities—RCS‑centric versus electronic/countermeasure‑centric evaluations.
5. Pilot and operator accounts: not found in current reporting
Search results include technical descriptions and advocacy pieces but do not publish authenticated pilot‑to‑pilot or operator‑to‑operator accounts that present logged comparison sorties between the two types. Available sources do not mention controlled pilot trials or declassified after‑action data comparing radar detection performance directly [3] [1] [2].
6. What the existing claims actually mean — useful and limited
When a source says Gripen “can detect L‑RCS targets” or that F‑35 is “hard to detect,” they synthesize manufacturer briefs, analyst opinion and system architecture implications rather than cite measured, peer‑reviewed detection curves. Those qualitative claims illuminate design intent (RCS reduction, EW, swashplate coverage, sensor fusion) but do not substitute for instrumented ROC (receiver operating characteristic) charts, which are absent from the current corpus [2] [1] [3].
7. Hidden agendas and source perspectives to watch
Vendor and national‑interest narratives tilt coverage: Swedish/Gripen‑friendly outlets stress EW, maintainability and swashplate advantages [2] [3], while U.S./Western security‑leaning pieces foreground F‑35 stealth and fusion superiority as decisive [1] [4]. Readers should treat performance claims with awareness of those implicit programmatic and industrial incentives [2] [1].
8. Practical next steps for a reader seeking real test data
To obtain the kind of documented comparisons you ask about requires either: declassified trials from government test agencies, peer‑reviewed technical papers, or leak/whistleblower releases — none are present in these sources. Pursue formal test reports from national flight test centers, NATO evaluations, or FOIA requests to procurement agencies; the reviewed sources make clear such publicly releasable, instrumented comparisons are not currently available [3] [2] [1].
Limitations: This analysis is constrained to the provided reporting set; specific numeric detection figures, comparative ROC curves, or documented pilot sortie logs are not found in those documents [3] [1] [2].