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How do the radar detection ranges of AESA systems on Gripen E and F-35A compare against different target RCS profiles?
Executive summary
Public reporting does not provide hard numerical radar-detection ranges for the Gripen E’s AESA versus the F‑35A’s radar signature across specific RCS values; most available articles describe qualitative differences — that the F‑35 has a much lower RCS and that the Gripen E has a new AESA and strong EW and sensor‑fusion capabilities [1] [2]. Commentators conclude the F‑35’s low observable design gives it an advantage at beyond‑visual‑range detection and engagement, while Saab and supporters of the Gripen point to advanced radar, EW, IRST and sensor fusion as mitigating factors [3] [4] [2].
1. What the published pieces actually say about radars and RCS
Reporting emphasizes platform roles rather than providing detection‑range tables: articles note the Gripen E introduced a new AESA radar and improved field of view/range and pairs that radar with IRST and strong EW/sensor fusion [2] [4] [5]. Coverage of the F‑35 focuses on its low observable (stealth) shape and correspondingly small radar cross section, which is repeatedly said to make it “difficult to detect and target” and to give it an advantage in beyond‑visual‑range fights [3]. None of the pieces in the sample publish manufacturer‑grade detection envelopes or RCS‑versus‑range curves (available sources do not mention numerical detection ranges).
2. The central technical tradeoff described by reporters
Journalists frame the contest as stealth versus signature management plus active sensing: the F‑35’s stealth reduces the range at which adversary radars can see it, whereas Gripen E’s AESA, IRST and sophisticated EW/sensor fusion aim to detect and track targets (including low‑observable ones) by combining active and passive inputs or by electronic attack/mitigation [2] [4] [1]. Analysts therefore argue the F‑35 holds a raw detection‑advantage due to low RCS, and the Gripen competes through situational awareness, emissions control and counter‑detection tactics [3] [4].
3. Conflicting perspectives in the reporting
Some outlets present a stark “F‑35 superiority” narrative: National Security Journal asserts the F‑35’s low RCS yields a “decisive advantage” for BVR (beyond‑visual‑range) engagements [3]. Conversely, sources favorable to Saab — Canadian Defence Review, 19FortyFive and Czech/defence commentary — stress the Gripen E’s upgraded radar, EW and IRST, saying these systems and tactics can “counter‑stealth” and make the Gripen competitive in many missions [4] [2] [1]. Those two angles coexist in the reporting without a definitive numerical adjudication [3] [4].
4. What’s missing from the public record in these sources
Precise detection ranges for an AESA (Gripen E) versus a low‑observable F‑35A at specified RCS levels, altitudes, aspect angles, and environmental conditions are not published in the provided articles — neither government test data nor manufacturer RCS tables appear in these pieces (available sources do not mention detection‑range numbers or controlled test results) [1] [2] [3].
5. How to interpret qualitative claims responsibly
When reports say “F‑35 is harder to detect,” they reflect the well‑understood physics of stealth: lower RCS tends to reduce radar detection range. When reporting emphasizes Gripen’s counter‑stealth measures, it points to multi‑sensor fusion, EW and IRST as force multipliers that can shrink the operational gap [3] [4] [2]. Neither claim in the sample is presented with controlled comparative data; treat both as tactical/architectural assertions rather than quantified test outcomes [2] [4] [3].
6. Practical implications for operators and procurement debates
Writers use these technical summaries to support strategic choices: proponents of the F‑35 cite stealth and superior BVR survivability; proponents of the Gripen emphasize lower acquisition and operating cost plus flexible sensor suites and EW that suit dispersed operations and contested environments [2] [4] [1]. Those policy and budget tradeoffs drive many procurement arguments in the articles rather than a closed technical verdict on radar detection ranges [2] [1].
7. If you need hard detection numbers next
The articles suggest that only controlled tests, classified measurements or manufacturer disclosures can provide RCS‑to‑range curves. None of the provided reporting offers that data, so a fact‑based numerical comparison would require access to test reports or technical documentation beyond these sources (available sources do not mention specific test reports or numeric RCS/range tables) [1] [2] [3].
Summary: the available coverage agrees on broad principles — F‑35 stealth reduces detectability, Gripen E brings a modern AESA/IRST/EW package and sensor fusion — but does not provide the numeric radar detection ranges by RCS profile necessary to make the precise technical comparison readers often want [3] [2] [4] [1].