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How do the sensor suites (radar, IRST, ESM) of Gripen E and F-35A compare in range and update rate?
Executive summary
Public reporting in the supplied sources makes only general, qualitative comparisons of the Gripen E and F‑35A sensor suites — claiming the F‑35 is a fifth‑generation aircraft with “better sensors” while Gripen E is said to have a modern AESA radar, strong EW/ESM and passive sensors — but none of the sources provide concrete numeric ranges or update‑rate specifications for radar, IRST, or ESM systems (not found in current reporting) [1] [2] [3].
1. Top‑line: generation labels and the implication for sensors
The available material frames the F‑35 as a 5th‑generation type with “better sensors” and the Gripen as a 4th‑generation design with modernized avionics; that framing is used to imply superior situational awareness for the F‑35 but does not itself quantify detection ranges or update rates [1]. This is a common shorthand in commentary: generation often signals integration and fusion capability rather than a specific radar power or IRST sensitivity [1].
2. What sources say about Gripen E sensors
Reporting credits the Gripen E with a new AESA radar, an advanced electronic warfare (EW) suite using GaN components, “numerous passive sensors” and enhanced situational awareness driven by human‑machine collaboration and AI; writers argue these features make Gripen E “not far behind” and in some areas even surpass the F‑35 [2] [3]. Those pieces highlight capability areas (AESA, EW/ESM, passive sensors) but stop short of numeric performance claims such as detection range or scan/update rates [2] [3].
3. What sources say about F‑35 sensors
Sources describe the F‑35 as having “better sensors” overall and superior situational awareness due to sensor technology and fusion, a common argument in comparative write‑ups that positions the F‑35’s integrated sensor suite as a decisive advantage [1] [4]. Again, the supplied articles do not list concrete radar/IRST/ESM specifications — ranges, update frequencies, or signal‑processing latencies are not provided (not found in current reporting).
4. Electronic warfare and ESM — competing narratives
Some writers emphasize Gripen E’s EW/ECM and spherical self‑defence capabilities, noting GaN‑based EW suites that bolster passive detectability and survivability [2]. Other analyses assert the F‑35’s sensor fusion and stealth give it an “decisive advantage” in situational awareness despite Gripen’s agility and EW strengths [4]. The sources therefore present competing viewpoints: Saab‑friendly coverage focuses on EW/AI/passive gains [2] [3] while pro‑F‑35 pieces stress integrated stealth‑sensor fusion superiority [1] [4].
5. What’s missing — ranges and update rates
None of the supplied articles provide numeric radar detection ranges, IRST detection distances, ESM sensitivity levels, nor scan/update‑rate figures for either platform; when asked for specific performance numbers, the only honest answer from these sources is that such figures are not published in the cited reporting (not found in current reporting) [2] [3] [1] [4].
6. Why technical numbers are scarce in open reporting
These pieces illustrate why: vendors and manufacturers rarely publish raw sensor curves or update‑rate numbers in open‑source articles; comparisons are often framed qualitatively (AESA, GaN, sensor fusion, stealth) and used rhetorically to argue operational advantage without releasing hard technical metrics [2] [1]. That pattern explains the gap between descriptive claims and quantified performance.
7. How to interpret qualitative claims cautiously
When a source says “better sensors” or “superior situational awareness,” treat that as shorthand for a bundle of things — radar power, software fusion, emissions control, passive sensors, data links — not as a single measurable metric. The sources disagree on which platform holds the edge depending on which attributes they privilege (EW/passive vs stealth/fusion) [2] [1] [4].
8. Next steps for a numbers‑based answer
To obtain verified numeric ranges and update rates you will need technical datasheets, manufacturer disclosures, or independent test reports not included among the supplied sources; the current reporting does not supply those figures, so a follow‑up search of official Saab or lockheed technical publications, defence test reports, or classified/controlled evaluations would be necessary (not found in current reporting) [2] [3] [1].
Limitations: this analysis relies strictly on the provided sources; where they lack hard specs I explicitly note that omission rather than infer numbers [2] [3] [1] [4].