Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
How does the Gripen E/F electronic warfare suite compare to the F-35's AN/ASQ-239 and Rafale's SPECTRA in threat detection and self-protection?
Executive summary
The public reporting and analyses portray the F‑35’s AN/ASQ‑239 as a 5th‑generation, sensor‑centric EW/sensor‑fusion suite that gives the jet very high emitter localization and situational‑awareness capabilities, while Rafale’s SPECTRA is repeatedly described as one of the most advanced 4.5‑generation self‑protection suites and highly integrated with the aircraft’s sensors and weapons [1] [2]. Coverage on Gripen E/F’s EW — variably called Arexis or a new EW package and tied to Raven ES‑05 radar, GaN TRMs, networking and expendable decoys — portrays it as modern, modular and upgradeable but generally treated as a different tradeoff (openness, low cost, networked defence) rather than a straight capability‑for‑capability superior to either rival [3] [4] [5].
1. Big picture: three different philosophies
The F‑35 is presented in the sources as a stealth‑first, sensor‑fusion platform where AN/ASQ‑239 is integral to detecting and precisely locating emitters to enable EMCON and engagement while preserving low observability [1]. The Rafale + SPECTRA approach is a fully integrated, sovereign “all‑round” self‑protection suite that emphasizes jamming, threat warning and decoys tightly coupled to aircraft systems [2] [6]. The Gripen E/F is framed as a smaller, modular, cost‑efficient fighter that trades extreme stealth for agility, strong networking, accessible upgrades and modern EW add‑ons (GaN, Raven AESA, expendable decoys) to achieve tough survivability for its price point [3] [5].
2. Threat detection — who ‘sees’ the threat first
Sources argue the AN/ASQ‑239 provides advanced emitter localization in azimuth and elevation and feeds the F‑35’s sensor fusion so the airplane can treat EW as a primary sensor for situational awareness [1]. Rafale’s SPECTRA is credited with cueing and enhancing radar detection and even increasing effective radar ranges through cueing — SPECTRA is repeatedly characterized as among the top 4.5‑gen systems for threat detection and targeting [2] [6]. Gripen’s Raven ES‑05 AESA plus Skyward IRST and new EW packages are described as giving strong detection and multi‑sensor awareness, but coverage emphasizes modularity and networked cues (e.g., from GlobalEye) rather than an inherent sensor‑fusion model identical to the F‑35’s AN/ASQ‑239 [3] [7].
3. Self‑protection and active countermeasures
Rafale’s SPECTRA is repeatedly presented as a robust self‑protection system offering jamming, decoys and missile‑warning integration; reporting stresses Dassault/Thales’ full integration across radar, EW and weapons [2] [6]. The F‑35’s AN/ASQ‑239 is described as enabling precision emitter location and so supports low‑signature tactics and selective jamming/EMCON to minimize exposure — a capability framed as qualitatively different from conventional EW suites [1]. Gripen E/F has adopted modern measures including GaN‑based transmit/receive modules, BriteCloud expendable RF decoys and enhanced AESA mechanics; analysts highlight Gripen’s active‑protection upgrades and emphasis on expendables and networked protection rather than a monolithic internal EW architecture [5] [3].
4. Integration and upgradeability: whose system ages better?
Coverage praises Rafale’s indigenous integration — SPECTRA is part of a sovereign French stack with deep integration into radar and weapons [2]. F‑35’s AN/ASQ‑239 is tied to Lockheed’s deep sensor‑fusion philosophy, making upgrades consequential but also highly interdependent with the platform’s stealth and mission systems [1]. Gripen’s publicly emphasized selling point is modularity, openness and ease of replacement/upgrades — the aircraft is described as deliberately upgradable and interoperable, which proponents argue reduces obsolescence risk [3] [4].
5. Operational tradeoffs and contexts
Analysts and outlets stress context: Rafale+SPECTRA favors sovereign, heavy‑payload strike missions with integrated EW; F‑35+AN/ASQ‑239 favors stealthy penetration and minimal emissions with precision emitter geolocation; Gripen favors cost‑effective networked operations, easy upgrades, and use alongside external assets (AWACS/GlobalEye) to punch above its weight. Which is “better” depends on doctrine: massed stealthy penetration (F‑35), integrated sovereign all‑weather strike and self‑protection (Rafale), or distributed, affordable force with rapid upgrade cycles (Gripen) [1] [2] [3].
6. Limits of public reporting and disagreements
Public sources stress capability claims but omit detailed technical metrics and classified performance tests; specific performance numbers, electronic power budgets, sidelobe behaviour and real‑world DRFM/anti‑DRFM resilience are not publicly released (available sources do not mention classified test metrics). Some outlets assert Gripen’s EW equals or surpasses Rafale, while others rank SPECTRA ahead among 4.5‑gen suites — these disagreements reflect differing emphases (sovereignty, upgrade path, combat role) and partisan/marketing bias in reporting [5] [6] [4].
7. Bottom line for buyers and analysts
If your priority is passive/active emitter localization and a sensor‑fusion centric playbook built around stealth, the F‑35’s AN/ASQ‑239 is presented as the distinct approach; if you prize sovereign, tightly integrated self‑protection across airframe and weapons, SPECTRA is widely lauded; if you value modularity, lower cost, rapid upgrades and networked defence with modern EW add‑ons, Gripen E/F is portrayed as an efficient and adaptable choice [1] [2] [3]. All three approaches have defenders in the reporting; public sources do not allow definitive technical ranking on classified measures (available sources do not mention classified comparative test data).