Can the Gripen's electronic warfare capabilities counter the F-35's advanced stealth features?

1. The Central Disagreement: Can EW Beat Stealth?

Public technical comparisons and reporting present a clear divide between two findings: one set concludes that Gripen’s EW is powerful but not a blanket counter to F‑35 stealth, while another stresses potential capability parity in certain missions. Multiple analyses argue the F‑35’s integrated sensor fusion and low radar cross‑section (LRS) give it the initial detection and engagement advantage at standoff ranges, limiting the Gripen’s ability to engage first without support ^{[1] [4]}. Conversely, Saab and supportive reporting highlight Gripen E’s spherical EW coverage, AESA radar integrations, and ES‑05 Raven sensor that can detect much smaller targets and work in networked jamming/decoy roles, suggesting scenarios where Gripen’s EW could degrade F‑35 survivability or situational awareness if exploited tactically ^{[3] [5] [6]}. The disparate claims hinge on whether EW is treated as a point solution or as part of a larger, networked kill chain.

2. Platform Strengths: What Each Aircraft Brings to Electronic Warfighting

The factual record attributes distinct strengths to both platforms. The F‑35 is repeatedly noted for its stealth shaping, internal sensors and fusion, and secure datalinks that provide early warning and targeting advantages; recent reporting also documents upgrades such as expendable active decoys designed to defeat missile and radar threats ^{[7] [4]}. The Gripen E is documented with a modern EW architecture: AESA radar integration, spherical EW coverage for self‑defense, and the capacity to integrate external jammers or decoys while maintaining high agility and lower operating costs ^{[3] [5] [6]}. These are complementary facts: F‑35 improves detection and networked effect, while Gripen emphasizes EW and self‑protection suites to complicate targeting ^{[2] [3]}.

3. Tactical Realities: When EW Can Narrow the Gap

Operational reporting and manufacturer claims make clear that context determines outcomes. In contested, beyond‑visual‑range (BVR) scenarios where the F‑35 exploits passive detection and fused ISR, the F‑35 typically retains the initiative; Gripen’s EW can attempt to deny or spoof that picture, but success requires favorable geometry, support from ground or airborne sensors, and timely employment of jammers or decoys ^{[1] [2]}. In close‑in engagements, or when Gripen operates within a well‑integrated EW and sensor network, its agility and electronic defensive/offensive measures become far more relevant and can impose real costs on F‑35 operations ^{[1] [4]}. The verifiable point is that EW is an enabler, not a guaranteed substitute for stealth.

4. Sources and Possible Agendas: Reading the Evidence Carefully

The bundle of analyses includes industry and media pieces that sometimes reflect vested perspectives: manufacturer literature emphasizes Gripen’s EW advances and operational economics, while defense‑oriented outlets underscore the F‑35’s sensor fusion and survivability ^{[3] [1]}. Reporting across 2014–2025 shows evolving claims as both platforms and countermeasures iterate; older comparisons make broader assertions that recent technical updates complicate. The factual takeaway is that source posture matters: promotional materials highlight strengths selectively, and independent journalism tends to emphasize operational implications and known limitations ^{[6] [4]}.

5. Practical Conclusions: What Decision‑makers Should Expect

Decision‑grade conclusions drawn from the documented analyses state that Gripen’s EW can challenge elements of F‑35 stealth under certain conditions but cannot be treated as an unconditional counter. Effective mitigation of F‑35 advantages typically requires integrated sensor networks, cooperative jamming, and tactical discipline; absent those, the F‑35’s low observability and fusion provide a persistent edge at standoff ranges ^{[1] [5]}. Policymakers and operators should weigh platform costs, alliance sensor architectures, and mission profiles: for smaller air forces the Gripen offers a cost‑effective mix of EW, agility, and flexibility, but in peer contests the F‑35’s system‑level advantages are decisive unless EW is employed as part of a broader multi‑domain strategy ^{[2] [3]}.