How have exercise findings influenced procurement, tactics, or upgrades to improve Gripen–F-35 cooperation?
Executive summary
Exercise and evaluation results have driven debate, industrial offers and operational arguments that shape how Gripen and F‑35 fleets might be procured, integrated or kept separate. Leaked/official Canadian evaluations show the F‑35 scoring far higher on “mission performance” and upgradability (Radio‑Canada/CBC reporting), while Saab’s industrial and sovereignty pitch — including offers to build Gripens or parts in Canada — reshaped political calculations and forced discussions of mixed fleets and interoperability [1] [2] [3].
1. Exercises and evaluations produced hard numbers that favour the F‑35
Canada’s internal competition data, published by Radio‑Canada and reported by CBC, found the F‑35 “dominated” the Gripen in the 2021 Defence Department competition, with the Gripen‑E scoring about 33% and the F‑35 winning by a wide margin on core capability and upgradeability metrics [1]. That technical verdict has been the baseline that defence officials cite when arguing for a single, fifth‑generation fleet to preserve capability and ease of sustainment [1].
2. Industry pitches turned exercise results into political leverage
Saab and Swedish officials translated capability debates into an industrial offer: local assembly, technology transfer and thousands of jobs in Canada. Saab’s pitch explicitly frames Gripen advantages — sovereignty over testing/upgrades and lower lifecycle costs — as a counterweight to the F‑35’s technical lead [2] [4]. Those commercial proposals changed the political equation, prompting Ottawa to re‑examine the F‑35 commitment even after initial funds were spent [2] [3].
3. Interoperability and NORAD ties complicated any switch
Defence analysts and retired RCAF leaders warned that diverging from the F‑35 risks operational friction within NORAD and NATO, because a mixed or alternate fleet weakens the common logistical and sensor‑fusion advantages the F‑35 provides [5] [3]. The leaked Canadian evaluation’s emphasis on the F‑35’s mission networking role reinforces the argument that exercises and networked testing favoured the U.S. platform on alliance interoperability grounds [1] [3].
4. Procurement tactics shifted from pure capability to industrial and sovereignty goals
Exercise findings did not solely dictate procurement tactics; political priorities did. Ottawa’s reconsideration of the F‑35 after trade and diplomatic tensions with the U.S. shows exercises are one input among sovereignty, jobs and strategic diversification. Saab used that opening to propose not just jets but an industrial footprint in Canada — a tactic aimed at converting political anxiety into a procurement advantage [4] [2] [3].
5. Proposals for mixed fleets reflect trade‑offs revealed by exercises
Several outlets reported that officials considered a split buy — keeping some F‑35s while buying Gripens — as a compromise between capability (backed by evaluation results) and sovereignty/industrial demands [6] [7]. Defence staff warned a two‑type fleet would be operationally inefficient, a conclusion rooted in exercise and sustainment modelling that values commonality and lifecycle planning [6] [7].
6. Gripen’s practical strengths were highlighted by non‑stealth metrics
Reporting points out where Gripen tests and demonstrations play to its strengths: affordability, rough‑field operations, and lower maintenance costs, which are attractive for homeland airspace defence and Arctic operations that figure in Canadian planning [8] [9]. Saab explicitly contrasts these practical operational features and local upgrade autonomy against the F‑35’s more constrained sovereign control model [2] [9].
7. Exercises catalysed political theatre as much as technical change
The technical winner in exercises became an element in a larger political narrative: leaked evaluations showing F‑35 superiority collided with Saab’s high‑profile job offers and Sweden’s diplomatic outreach, forcing public debate and parliamentary scrutiny [1] [4] [7]. This interaction shows how empirical test results can be amplified or attenuated depending on industrial diplomacy and domestic politics [4] [7].
8. What the sources do not say
Available sources do not mention specific joint flight‑test programs or concrete technical interoperability upgrades developed from bilateral Gripen–F‑35 exercises. They do not document any formal cooperative test campaigns that changed avionics or datalink standards between the two types (not found in current reporting).
9. Bottom line for readers
Exercise and evaluation data gave the F‑35 a decisive technical edge in Canada’s internal scoring, but that fact alone did not lock procurement: Saab’s industrial offers and sovereignty arguments shifted tactics and kept the Gripen competitive in political terms. The policy debate now turns on whether Canada prioritises alliance‑level interoperability and the F‑35’s sensor‑fusion demonstrated in evaluations, or industrial sovereignty, cost and Arctic suitability emphasised by Saab [1] [2] [3].