Have any Gripen operators later reconsidered or supplemented their fleets with F-35s, and when?

1. Old choices, new doubts: Canada’s 2025 rethink

Canada — which had committed funds for an initial 16 F‑35s and a wider intent to buy up to 88 — publicly began reassessing that plan in 2025 and entered active talks with Saab about Gripen as an alternative, including promises of Canadian assembly and transfer of industrial work ^{[1] [2]}. Reporting frames Ottawa’s move as a political and industrial decision as much as a capability one: Saab’s offer to build in Canada and transfer IP is central to its pitch, while retired RCAF officers and defence officials publicly warned that a mixed Gripen/F‑35 fleet would create costly logistics and interoperability problems ^{[1] [3] [4]}.

2. What “reconsidered or supplemented” means in practice

Available reporting shows more debate and proposal than firm supplementing: Canada’s review contemplated keeping the initially funded 16 F‑35s and filling the rest with Gripens, but as of the cited coverage the Canadian government had only begun discussions and had not finalized a mixed-fleet contract ^{[2] [3]}. Other articles describe political pressure, expert warnings, and industry offers rather than completed procurement decisions to add F‑35s to existing Gripen fleets ^{[5] [6]}.

3. Operational and political arguments on both sides

Pro‑F‑35 voices in the Canadian debate emphasise fifth‑generation capabilities and alliance interoperability; retired air force chiefs and defence officials warned a hybrid fleet would “weaken Canada’s airpower” and complicate logistics ^{[4] [6]}. Saab and some analysts argue Gripen’s lower operating cost and faster delivery — plus industrial offsets — make it attractive and affordable, with Saab saying Canada could field Gripens within three to five years ^{[2] [7]}. These are competing framings: alliance/interoperability risk versus cost/sovereignty and industrial benefits ^{[4] [7]}.

4. Precedents and limits in the sources

The supplied sources document many procurement bids, political reversals, and renewed offers (e.g., Sweden’s active pitch, Saab’s comments), but they do not identify a past Gripen operator who then definitively added F‑35s to supplement an existing Gripen fleet (not found in current reporting). Wikipedia snippets and news items cover many countries’ procurement contests and shifting preferences but stop short of recording a completed Gripen-to-F‑35 supplement pathway ^{[8] [9]}.

5. Technical, industrial and geopolitical constraints noted in reporting

Coverage highlights practical constraints: interoperability (refuelling systems differences between “hose-and-drogue” and “flying boom”), U.S. controls over some components, and the political fallout of choosing a non‑U.S. fighter — all factors that shape whether countries keep or supplement Gripens with F‑35s ^{[7] [10]}. Defence experts cited potential extra costs (for tankers and maintenance chains) and export-control risks as weighing heavily in procurement calculus ^{[7] [10]}.

6. What to watch next

Based on the sources, the story to follow is whether Canada moves from discussion to contract and whether other potential buyers (Portugal, Colombia, etc.) pivot between F‑35 and Gripen offers; Saab’s industrial promises and any confirmed governmental decisions will be decisive signals ^{[2] [10] [9]}. For now, coverage documents vigorous debate and offers but no definitive historical precedent of a Gripen operator later supplementing its fleet with F‑35s in the sources provided (not found in current reporting).

Limitations: this analysis relies only on the supplied articles and Wikipedia extracts; if you want a broader global procurement history or post‑2025 developments, additional sources beyond those provided would be needed.