Are there published after-action reports comparing gripen and f-35 performance in exercises?

1. What the question really asks and how reporting answers it

The user seeks published, post-exercise (after-action) documents that directly compare the two types on equal terms; the material provided contains leaked evaluation scores from a procurement competition and news accounts of exercises, but not a formal, public after-action report authored by an operational authority that details exercise timelines, tactics, sensor logs and objective performance metrics for both jets together ^{[1] [3]}.

2. The clearest published comparison: Canada’s 2021 competition scoring

Radio‑Canada/CBC reporting about Canada’s 2021 fighter competition produced a numerical capability table that gave the F‑35 a 95% military‑capability score (57.1/60) versus 33% for the Gripen‑E (19.8/60), a widely cited document in recent coverage and commentary ^{[1] [2]}; outlets interpreted that as a head‑to‑head performance comparison within a procurement framework rather than a classical exercise after‑action report ^[1].

3. Media accounts of exercises and first‑time engagements

News reporting documents that Danish F‑35s and Swedish Gripens flew simulated one‑on‑one air combat training in March 2024, and those articles frame outcomes and platform features (stealth advantages for the F‑35, Gripen strengths in runway flexibility and Meteor missile integration) but do not publish an official after‑action report with the raw exercise data ^[3].

4. Conflicting readings, skepticism and technical caveats in the sources

Analysts and commentators cited in the reporting warn that the procurement scoring may have favored criteria aligned with F‑35 doctrine (stealth, deep‑strike mission profiles) and that score tables omit full methodological transparency, prompting calls to see the detailed metrics and weighting before accepting headline percentages ^{[2] [1]}; critics also point to operational availability and Block 4 upgrade delays as counterpoints to high “upgradability” scores for the F‑35 in those documents ^[2].

5. What supporters of the Gripen emphasize and where agendas appear

Pro‑Gripen coverage and advocacy stress cold‑weather performance, short/rough‑field operating ability, lower lifecycle costs and sovereignty benefits—points repeatedly raised in exercise summaries and earlier promotional materials—and suggest those mission sets may not be fairly represented in procurement scoring favoring fifth‑generation stealth missions ^{[3] [4]}; both industry actors and national procurement politics can shape which comparisons are released and how they are framed ^[4].

6. The reporting gap: no publicly released formal after‑action exercise reports found in sources

Across the assembled reporting, there is no published, authoritative after‑action report that simultaneously documents exercise telemetry, kill‑chains, rules‑of‑engagement, and objective scoring for Gripen versus F‑35 sorties in the same exercise and made available to the public; the available documents are procurement evaluation scores and press summaries of exercises, which are informative but not the same as full after‑action technical reports ^{[1] [3]}.

7. Bottom line and pathways for verification

The public record in these sources shows comparative claims and a leaked‑style capability scoring that heavily favored the F‑35 in Canada’s 2021 process ^[1], plus journalistic coverage of limited bilateral exercises ^[3], but it does not provide a released, formal after‑action exercise report that methodically compares Gripen and F‑35 performance side‑by‑side with raw exercise data; obtaining such a document would likely require access to defence‑department exercise archives, Freedom of Information disclosures, or official releases from participating air forces—none of which appear in the provided reporting ^{[1] [3]}.