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What are the differences in avionics and radar systems between the Gripen and F-35?
Executive summary
The F‑35 is repeatedly described in the provided reporting as a fifth‑generation fighter with "very advanced avionics" and sensor fusion that share data across forces; the Gripen (especially the Gripen E) is presented as a highly capable 4.5‑generation design emphasizing lower operating cost, modular avionics upgrades and electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures rather than full stealth [1] [2] [3]. Available sources frame the core differences as: F‑35 = integrated stealth + sensor fusion and cutting‑edge avionics; Gripen = modern AESA radar, strong EW suite, and lower lifecycle cost with flexible datalinks [1] [4] [2].
1. F‑35: "Sensor fusion and stealth first" — the avionics claim
Reporting characterizes the F‑35 as the leader in avionics and sensor fusion: an architecture that fuses inputs from radar, electro‑optical sensors, and datalinks into a single pilot view and that shares data across services and allies, a capability emphasized as a main advantage over non‑stealth designs [1] [3]. Multiple outlets call its avionics "very advanced" and point to the platform’s role as a networked node rather than only an aircraft [3] [1].
2. Gripen: modular avionics, AESA radar, and "best sensor dominates" doctrine
Sources note the Gripen E carries a modern AESA radar (Raven ES‑05 / PS‑05 upgrades on earlier versions) and an advanced EW/self‑protection suite; Saab and analysts stress a "best sensor dominates" approach where Gripen can ingest off‑board data and use its radar/TAU datalink functions to exploit shared tracking [4] [2]. Hush‑Kit and other analysis stress Gripen’s flexible, upgradeable avionics and a focus on dispersed operations and quick serviceability [5] [2].
3. Radar performance: AESA on Gripen vs. stealth‑centred detection tradeoffs
The Gripen E’s Raven AESA radar is explicitly mentioned in sources as a modern sensor and a core part of its capability package [4]. Commentary also argues that without stealth, Gripen relies more on jamming/countermeasures and radar/data‑share tactics to mitigate detection, while the F‑35’s low radar cross‑section (RCS) gives it a different tactical envelope—detection avoidance rather than active EW first [2]. Some outlets claim Gripen radars can detect low‑RCS targets at competitive ranges, but that claim appears in opinion pieces rather than an authoritative dataset in these sources [2] [6].
4. Electronic Warfare and countermeasures: offense vs. invisibility
Multiple pieces frame the Gripen as relying on EW — jamming and countermeasures — to survive in contested airspace, whereas the F‑35 emphasizes passive survivability through stealth plus its sensor suite [2]. The practical implication in reporting is that Gripen’s survivability doctrine is active electronic attack plus data networking; the F‑35’s doctrine layers stealth with sensor fusion and some EW capability [2] [3].
5. Interoperability, datalinks and "network node" roles
Sources repeatedly emphasize the F‑35’s role as a coalition sensor‑fusion node that shares a common operational picture with other platforms [1] [3]. Gripen advocates counter that modern Gripens can operate with NATO systems and use tactical datalinks (including Link‑16 or proprietary variants) to plug into allied networks, making interoperability less of a binary than some rhetoric suggests [7] [8].
6. Cost, maintainability and upgradeability as part of the avionics debate
Several reports place the avionics/radar discussion within procurement politics: Gripen is pitched on lower acquisition and operating costs, rapid maintenance and local industrial participation; F‑35 proponents stress superior sensor fusion and fifth‑generation capabilities but accept higher lifecycle costs [9] [10] [7]. Note that claims about hourly operating costs and other cost figures are disputed in the sources and sometimes traced to vendor studies or opinion pieces [11] [9].
7. Where the sources disagree or are thin
The provided material contains opinion and advocacy as well as technical descriptions. Some outlets assert radar ranges and detection advantages for one side or the other (e.g., specific km figures) without consistent, independently verified data across sources [6] [12]. Available sources do not provide a comprehensive, side‑by‑side technical spec table with validated detection ranges, signal processing throughput, or classified avionics details—those specifics are not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting).
8. Bottom line for readers and procurement implications
If a customer values stealth plus integrated sensor fusion and a coalition data‑node, the F‑35 is portrayed as the superior avionics package; if a customer prioritizes lower lifecycle cost, rapid turnaround, modular upgrades, and a strong EW/sensor mix without full stealth, Gripen E is presented as the pragmatic alternative [1] [2] [9]. Both camps use selective technical claims and cost figures in advocacy; readers should treat numerical performance assertions with caution and seek direct technical evaluations or classified test data for final comparisons [11] [4].