How have real combat engagements or exercises shown differences in first-detection ranges between Gripen and F-35?

1. Why there’s no clean “who‑detected‑first” data from real fights

Neither combat nor multinational exercises cited in the available material provide a documented, verifiable log of first‑detection ranges pitting an operational F‑35 against a Gripen in contested conditions — reporting focuses on capabilities and theoretical envelopes, not forensic combat detection records; therefore claims about specific detection distances in real engagements are not found in current reporting (available sources do not mention direct combat detection-range data) ^{[1] [2]}.

2. The F‑35’s claimed advantages: stealth plus sensor fusion

Analysts and manufacturer descriptions emphasize that the F‑35’s low observability plus “active sensor management” (fused radar, IRST, EW and datalinks autonomously coupled) tends to push its effective first‑detection and engagement envelope outward because it reduces enemy detectability while increasing the pilot’s situational awareness ^[2]. Coverage and reviews repeatedly stress that F‑35 design choices (internal weapons bays, radar‑absorbent features) make it “extremely hard to detect, at least from the front,” which underpins claims of longer practical first‑detection ranges in many scenarios ^{[1] [2]}.

3. Gripen’s counter‑arguments: radar, IRST and EW close gaps

Reporting on the Gripen highlights that modern Gripen E variants carry capable radars (PS‑05/A or Selex Raven as cited) alongside IRST and advanced electro‑optical and electronic‑warfare suites that can detect, track or complicate engagements even without full stealth; some commentators assert Gripen radar effective ranges (examples cited include PS‑05/A figures) and underscore Saab’s EW emphasis as a way to reduce the F‑35’s detection advantage ^{[3] [4] [5]}.

4. Published numbers are inconsistent and often theoretical

Open‑source pieces and comparison sites offer different ranges or effective envelopes — for example, one article cites radar effective detection ranges like “120 km” vs “160 km” for different systems — but such figures come from a mix of vendor claims, secondary reporting and analysis rather than verified combat logs; therefore those numbers must be treated as indicative, not definitive ^[4]. Some outlets present the F‑35 as able to detect Gripen “from long range,” while others stress Gripen’s radar/weapon reach in particular loadouts ^{[6] [4]}.

5. Exercises matter — but they’re not the same as combat

Multinational exercises can produce useful comparative telemetry, yet available reporting here does not point to published exercise data showing first‑detection dominance in F‑35 vs Gripen matchups; analysts note Gripen has been used in various allied exercises and the F‑35’s sensor fusion has been repeatedly demonstrated in training, but those demonstrations are reported as capability showcases rather than as transparent, independently verified detection‑range comparisons ^{[1] [2]}.

6. How to interpret conflicting claims and vested interests

Manufacturers, national procurement advocates and industry commentators have incentives to emphasize strengths: Lockheed touts the F‑35’s sensor fusion and stealth ^[2], while Saab‑friendly or cost‑conscious commentaries emphasize the Gripen’s radar, lower operating cost and EW features ^{[3] [5]}. Independent outlets often recycle vendor figures or make scenario assumptions, so readers should treat precise detection‑range numbers as contingent on assumed sensor mode, aspect angle, countermeasures, environment and rules of engagement ^{[2] [3]}.

7. Bottom line for decision‑makers and observers

Available reporting supports the conclusion that the F‑35’s stealth plus fused sensors typically confer a tactical edge in achieving earlier detection and engagement in many high‑threat scenarios, while the Gripen’s radar, IRST and EW systems can reduce that advantage in certain conditions — but there is no open, verifiable record of real combat first‑detection distances between the two platforms to settle the question absolutely ^{[2] [1] [3]}.