How do maintenance man-hours and supply chain issues differ between Gripen and F-35 fleets?
Executive summary
Available reporting shows Gripen is repeatedly presented as a low-maintenance, low-manhour-per-flight-hour fighter — Saab and several analysts cite figures around 10 maintenance man‑hours per flight hour (MMH/FH) and fast turnarounds of “under 20 minutes” for refuel/rearm [1] [2]. By contrast, watchdog reporting and audits document chronic F‑35 supply‑chain and delivery problems, engine delays and long upgrade slips that raise sustainment risks and higher reported operating costs and maintenance intensity (GAO and press reporting cite average delivery delays of ~238 days and thousands of parts shortages) [3] [4] [5]. Sources do not provide a single apples‑to‑apples MMH/FH comparison for modern Gripen E vs operational F‑35 fleets; they instead offer manufacturer claims for Gripen and GAO/press audits documenting F‑35 supply‑chain strains and lifecycle cost exposure [2] [3].
1. Maintenance man‑hours: Gripen’s low‑manhour narrative
Saab and historical Swedish Air Force figures are cited repeatedly to make a simple argument: Gripen was engineered for low sustainment burden. Flight Global published FMV/SwAF numbers showing a maintenance man‑hours‑per‑flight‑hour (MMH/FH) of roughly 10:1 and mean‑time‑to‑repair around 2.5 hours for earlier Gripen models [1]. Saab’s product pages and marketing reiterate quick turnarounds — “less than 20 minutes” to refuel and rearm for an air‑to‑air mission on Gripen E and a “small logistics footprint” that reduces personnel and spares needs [2]. Independent forum and industry commentary echoes low per‑hour operating cost claims ($5k–$10k/hour regionally) tied to those lower MMH/FH figures, but those posts vary widely over time and across users [6] [7].
2. Maintenance man‑hours: What the F‑35 evidence shows
None of the provided sources gives a definitive, consistently published MMH/FH for operational F‑35 units comparable to Saab’s Gripen figures. What is documented at length is sustainment complexity and lifecycle cost exposure: GAO and defense press report years of cost‑growth, schedule slips on the Block‑4 modernization and Technical Refreshes, and systemic delays in engines and components — including average aircraft delivery delays of ~238 days and thousands of missing parts on final assembly lines — all of which increase logistics and sustainment pressure [3] [4] [5]. Those supply‑chain strains and complex upgrade pathways imply higher maintenance intensity and risk, but the sources do not provide a single, verifiable MMH/FH number for the F‑35 in the field [3] [4].
3. Supply‑chain differences: centralized program vs sovereign support
The F‑35 is a multinational but U.S.‑led program with deep ties to Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney for airframe and engine production; GAO found recurring supply and production weaknesses — e.g., TR‑3 and F135 engine delays and more than 4,000 parts shortages — that delayed deliveries and complicate sustainment for all customers [4] [5]. Gripen’s sales pitch and some operators emphasise national autonomy: Saab has promised technology transfer, domestic assembly and long‑term maintenance to some prospective buyers, and its support concept stresses deployable maintenance and lower spare‑parts footprints [8] [9]. That contrast frames a trade‑off: F‑35 buyers plug into a large shared logistics enterprise that has scale but also systemic bottlenecks [3]; Gripen buyers can aim for more national control and fewer moving parts but may trade off stealth and sensor fusion capability [10] [2].
4. Cost and readiness trade‑offs cited by analysts and leaked reviews
Canadian reporting and leaked assessments cited in the sources frame the debate politically and operationally: proponents of F‑35 point to overwhelming capability scores in Canada’s internal review (F‑35 scoring ~95% vs Gripen ~33% in one leaked readout), while critics warn a mixed fleet would inflate training and maintenance burdens [11] [10]. Advocates of Gripen counter that its lower maintenance profile offsets mixed‑fleet logistics costs and supports austere operations such as Arctic deployments [10] [12]. Those are competing perspectives present in the files and must be weighed against the absence of uniform sustainment metrics across sources [11] [12].
5. Limits of available reporting and what isn’t said
Available sources do not offer a single, contemporaneous, independently‑audited MMH/FH table directly comparing Gripen E and fielded F‑35 fleets; claims for Gripen are driven largely by Saab data and past SwAF figures [1] [2], while F‑35 critiques focus on supply‑chain and programmatic shortfalls rather than a specific maintenance man‑hours per flying hour figure [3] [5]. Cost‑per‑flight‑hour numbers in open forums and press vary widely and sometimes mix operating and ownership costs; those disparities mean decision‑makers cannot rely on a single sourced metric from the materials provided here [6] [7].
6. Bottom line for planners and the public
If you prioritise low sortie‑generation manpower and a smaller logistics footprint, Saab and some operators present Gripen as the less maintenance‑intensive choice [1] [2]. If you prioritise stealth, sensor fusion and a common allied platform, the F‑35 wins on capability metrics in some assessments, but the program’s documented supply‑chain fragility and upgrade delays create sustainment risk and potential higher lifecycle costs [11] [3]. Decision‑makers need independently audited, apples‑to‑apples maintenance metrics — a gap the current reporting does not fill (not found in current reporting).