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What are the typical mission-capable (MC) and sortie-per-aircraft metrics reported by operators of Gripen and F-35?
Executive summary
Public reporting shows wide disagreement and sparse hard numbers when comparing Gripen and F‑35 mission-capable (MC) and sortie‑per‑aircraft metrics: some outlets highlight low F‑35 MC rates (for example, reporting that F‑35A MC was about 36% in 2023 for Canada’s concerns) while analyses of the Gripen stress design choices that boost availability and rapid turnaround [1] [2] [3]. Available sources do not offer a consistent, side‑by‑side table of typical MC and sorties‑per‑aircraft for both types across operators; much of the coverage is programmatic, doctrinal, or selective reporting of particular reports [3] [1].
1. What the numbers in public articles actually say — and what they don’t
Some articles cite very low F‑35 MC figures: a Canadian analysis and reporting around procurement debate repeatedly references a 36% F‑35A mission‑capable rate in 2023 to argue sustainment risk [1]. Separately, watchdog and press reporting notes that U.S. services have failed to meet F‑35 MC targets for years and that none of the three F‑35 variants met desired MC rates in fiscal 2018–2023, per GAO summaries [4] [5]. By contrast, available pieces on the Gripen focus on design and doctrine (rapid servicing, dispersed operations) and argue the type was built to maximize availability—but they do not produce a single, authoritative numerical MC or sorties‑per‑aircraft figure for operational fleets in the same way the F‑35 reporting does [3] [2]. Available sources do not mention a comprehensive, comparable dataset covering MC and sortie rates for Gripen and F‑35 across operators.
2. Why published F‑35 figures vary and how they’re used politically
Coverage of the F‑35 emphasizes programmatic readiness shortfalls and GAO or watchdog findings that the fleet has repeatedly missed MC targets [4] [5]. Those figures are often cited in national procurement debates (e.g., Canada) to argue operational risk and sustainment cost concerns [1]. The variance in reported MC numbers stems from different baselines (service targets vs. measured MC), variant differences (A/B/C), time windows, and whether the figure is an average, snapshot, or a single fiscal year—factors noted implicitly in the watchdog reporting cited by journalists [4] [5]. Readers should note those political uses: opponents of a purchase can spotlight low snapshots, while program supporters emphasize capability and improvement plans—both dynamics appear in the supplied reporting [1] [5].
3. How Gripen’s design philosophy shows up in reporting on availability
Analysis pieces and defense commentary emphasize Gripen’s deliberate design for low logistics burden: rapid turnarounds, minimal ground crew, and resilience at dispersed bases, traits framed as drivers of higher operational availability in doctrine and practice [3] [2]. Articles note Gripen’s maintenance concept (e.g., quick refuel/rearm targets, separation of mission systems from flight‑critical software) as reasons operators and advocates claim better sorties-per‑aircraft or quicker re‑commitment between missions [2] [3]. However, the sources stop short of publishing standardized sortie‑per‑aircraft or MC percentages from multiple operator fleets for an apples‑to‑apples comparison [3] [2].
4. What “sorties per aircraft” would require and why it’s rarely shown
Sorties‑per‑aircraft metrics depend on mission profile, training tempo, maintenance policy, parts supply, and operating environment. The supplied analytic piece underscores that availability is shaped by doctrine, logistics and supply‑chain realities rather than just platform design—explaining why simple sortie counts can mislead without context [3]. Neither the Gripen promotional/analysis pieces nor the watchdog F‑35 accounts provide a robust, cross‑operator sorties‑per‑aircraft dataset; public reporting typically gives MC snapshots or program critiques instead [3] [1].
5. Takeaway for decision‑makers and journalists
If you need rigorous comparison for procurement or analysis, current public sources recommend seeking raw MC and sortie logs from operators or oversight reports (GAO‑style) and ensuring the same definitions and timeframes are used. The supplied sources show clear narratives: watchdogs raising alarms on F‑35 MC shortfalls [4] [5] and analysts/advocates pointing to Gripen’s low‑logistics design and quick turnaround doctrine [3] [2]. But available sources do not provide a definitive, comparable numeric baseline for MC and sorties per aircraft across Gripen and F‑35 operators [3] [1].
Limitations: this analysis uses only the supplied articles; other official maintenance logs, service readiness reports, or manufacturer data are not included in these sources and thus are not accounted for here—available sources do not mention those datasets in the excerpts provided [3] [4].