Hamid Gul
Executive summary
Hamid Gul was a three-star Pakistani Army general best known for leading the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from 1987 to 1989 during the closing phase of the Soviet–Afghan war, and for the political and ideological footprint he left afterward [1] [2]. His tenure is widely credited with deepening ISI support for Afghan mujahideen and cultivating networks that long outlived the Soviet withdrawal, a legacy praised by Pakistan’s right and criticized by liberals and international observers [3] [4].
1. Who he was: soldier, spymaster, public figure
Hamid Gul was born on 20 November 1936 in Sargodha and commissioned into the Pakistan Army in 1956, rising over three decades to become a lieutenant-general and the ISI’s director-general from 1987–1989 [1] [5] [6]. After retiring he remained a visible defence analyst and media personality in Pakistan, known for outspoken views on India, conspiracy theories about global events, and sustained sympathy for Islamist causes [7] [6].
2. ISI chief during the Afghan jihad: facilitator and strategist
As head of ISI in the late 1980s, Gul presided over an agency that channeled American and Saudi funds and weapons to Afghan fighters resisting the Soviet occupation, and played a central role in shaping Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy as Soviet forces withdrew [3] [2]. Multiple obituaries and analyses describe his ISI tenure as pivotal to empowering Islamist militants in Afghanistan and cultivating relationships that would later be tied to the Taliban’s rise [3] [4].
3. The “godfather” label and contested legacy
Some analysts and regional commentators have labeled Gul a father or “godfather” of the Taliban because of his long-term backing of Islamist proxies and continued contacts with Afghan militants; defenders argue he was acting in what he saw as Pakistan’s strategic interest against India and Soviet influence [4] [3]. Critics inside Pakistan blamed him for “meddling in politics,” notably after the 1988 election when he allegedly helped cobble right‑wing alliances against Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party—a controversy that contributed to his removal the following year [3].
4. Political fallout and removal; later activism
Gul was dismissed as ISI chief after the 1988 election and replaced amid accusations of political interference; Benazir Bhutto’s government and some commentators regarded him as an inveterate plotter, while he and supporters blamed international pressure and rival factions for his ouster [3] [1]. In later years Gul opposed General Pervez Musharraf’s cooperation with the U.S. after 2001, participated in domestic political rallies, and remained a polarizing public figure until his death in 2015 [2] [8].
5. What his story reveals about Pakistan’s security state and narratives
Gul’s biography illustrates how Pakistan’s security apparatus during the 1980s embraced Islamist networks as instruments of regional policy, producing durable militant ecosystems and political strains at home; proponents framed this as strategic depth, while opponents warned of blowback and erosion of democratic norms [1] [4] [2]. Reporting on Gul reflects competing agendas: newspapers and analysts emphasize state culpability for empowering militants and his meddling in politics [3] [2], while his admirers and some right‑wing circles cast him as a patriot who advanced Pakistan’s regional interests [4].
6. Limits of available reporting and disputed claims
The sources establish Gul’s positions, chronology, and the broad contours of his influence, but detailed attribution of responsibility for specific militant actions, the precise mechanics of ISI networks, and definitive causation between his policies and later events remain matters of debate among scholars and journalists; the available reporting focuses on institutional patterns and public statements rather than a fully documented paper trail that proves single‑actor causation [3] [4] [2].