Has the U.S. ever tested or deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons from space?

1. The Cold War testbed: early U.S. ASAT development and tests

From the late 1950s through the 1970s the United States developed and tested multiple ASAT concepts — from air‑launched missiles like Bold Orion to ground and space‑based concepts — driven by fears after Sputnik and Soviet ASAT programs; U.S. planning documents from the era discuss developing and possibly deploying ASAT capabilities, though decisions about deployment were contested ^{[5] [6] [7]}. Historical surveys and archival summaries show the U.S. repeatedly experimented with ASAT designs and intercept approaches during that period ^{[8] [7]}.

2. The 1985 live intercept: ASM‑135 and Solwind P78‑1

The clearest, often‑cited example of the U.S. destroying a satellite is the ASM‑135 program: on 13 September 1985 a modified F‑15 launched an ASM‑135 interceptor that struck and destroyed the Solwind P78‑1 satellite at roughly 555 km altitude, producing hundreds of debris pieces; that event is recorded in multiple technical histories and fact sheets ^{[1] [2] [9]}. Congress tightened restrictions after that program, and subsequent policy moves limited destructive on‑orbit ASAT testing ^[9].

3. Post‑Cold War posture and the 2008 “response” test claim

U.S. officials and analysts say the U.S. largely stopped kinetic ASAT testing after the mid‑1980s; some sources note a U.S. “response” to China’s 2007 kinetic ASAT test with activities in 2008 intended to remind China the U.S. retained capability, though reporting frames the 2008 actions as signaling rather than a major debris‑creating intercept ^[4]. Secure World Foundation and other chroniclers list known direct‑ascent tests across decades and treat the U.S. as one of the historical testers ^{[1] [2]}.

4. The 2022 U.S. moratorium and current limits

In April 2022 the Biden administration publicly committed the United States “not to conduct destructive, direct‑ascent anti‑satellite (ASAT) missile testing” and urged this as a new international norm; commentators and policy shops from Carnegie to RAND and the Arms Control Association described that pledge as formalizing a de‑facto pause and intended to discourage debris‑creating tests after the high‑debris Russian 2021 intercept ^{[10] [11] [3]}. Analysts stress this pledge applies narrowly to destructive, direct‑ascent missile tests and leaves intact other counterspace research and non‑destructive testing options ^{[10] [12]}.

5. What “tested or deployed from space” means — and what sources say

If your query asks whether the U.S. has launched ASAT weapons from space (co‑orbital interceptors launched from orbit), available sources emphasize U.S. efforts focused on air‑, ground‑, and sea‑launched direct‑ascent interceptors and on developing counterspace tools; archival and survey material do not document a widely acknowledged U.S. deployment of space‑based kinetic ASAT weapons in orbit, and some doctrinal records show debates about deploying ASATs rather than clear deployment decisions ^{[7] [6] [8]}. Secure World Foundation’s timeline catalogs direct‑ascent tests but does not portray an active deployed space‑based kinetic ASAT force for the U.S. in recent decades ^[1].

6. Debris, norms, and competing perspectives

Proponents of the U.S. moratorium argue that destructive ASAT tests create long‑lived debris that endangers all users of low Earth orbit; critics say the commitment is unilateral and may constrain U.S. options while rival states continue testing or retain latent capabilities ^{[3] [13]}. Carnegie and RAND note the moratorium covers destructive direct‑ascent tests but leaves room for non‑destructive testing and for missile‑defense activities with ASAT‑relevant technology — a gap that China and Russia have flagged as ambiguous ^{[10] [11] [12]}.

7. Bottom line for your question

The U.S. has tested ASAT weapons (including the 1985 live intercept of Solwind and numerous Cold War-era tests) and has historically developed deployable concepts, but contemporary U.S. policy (since April 2022) rejects destructive direct‑ascent ASAT missile testing and emphasizes non‑destructive counterspace measures; sources do not document a current, deployed U.S. space‑based kinetic ASAT force in public records provided here ^{[1] [2] [3]}.