Have classification standards for drone targeting changed under subsequent administrations?
Executive summary
Policy and operational standards for drones in the U.S. have shifted sharply since 2021: federal action in 2024–25 accelerated security-driven procurement limits on foreign-made systems and pushed rapid BVLOS (beyond visual line of sight) rulemaking and Remote ID enforcement [1] [2]. Agencies and industry are now balancing tighter national‑security vetting and supply‑chain rules against FAA efforts to open routine BVLOS and certify airworthiness through new parts and processes [3] [2] [4].
1. A security-first turn: procurement and covered‑list rules
Starting in the FY25 NDAA and reinforced by White House guidance, federal policy prioritized cybersecurity and supply‑chain risk, creating a path to bar Chinese‑made systems from federal use unless cleared by national security reviews [1] [3]. Reporting and industry summaries show the FY25 NDAA will automatically add platforms like DJI to the FCC’s Covered List absent a completed agency risk assessment by a December 2025 deadline, which would block new models from federal procurement and restrict updates — a fundamentally different emphasis than earlier administrations that focused more on safety and integration than supply‑chain exclusion [1] [5].
2. FAA: from bespoke waivers to routinized BVLOS pathways
Regulatory direction for operations has moved in the opposite direction: the FAA and Transportation Secretary rolled out proposals to make BVLOS routine by creating Parts (e.g., proposed Parts 108/146 and CONOPS changes) and streamlining airworthiness acceptance that rely on performance and consensus standards rather than piecemeal waivers [2] [4] [6]. FAA documents and industry commentary describe a shift toward standardized certification and traffic‑management frameworks so BVLOS missions can scale safely [2] [4].
3. Remote ID and operational enforcement: normalization of identification requirements
By 2025, Remote ID moved from proposed practice to enforced expectation: multiple guides and FAA summaries note that drones requiring registration must broadcast Remote ID and that the FAA refined Part 107 waiver processes to demand demonstrable safety mitigations for flights outside standard limits [7] [8]. This marks a continuation of earlier safety priorities but with firmer technological enforcement tools to support both security and airspace management [7] [8].
4. Industry and operators face conflicting signals — security vs. access
The policy mix creates tension for operators: federal procurement and grant rules increasingly exclude certain foreign platforms for national‑security reasons while FAA rulemaking seeks to expand operational capability (BVLOS, UTM) that could benefit the same operators — provided their hardware and software meet airworthiness and security expectations [3] [6] [4]. Trade‑restriction timers in the NDAA and potential FCC authority to retroactively restrict devices mean manufacturers and buyers face uncertainty about platform availability and future updates [5] [9].
5. Different administrations, different emphases — who changed what?
Available sources attribute some policy moves to specific administrations and actors: a White House executive order and OMB/agency procurement guidance intensified cybersecurity and sourcing standards [3], while an FAA agenda under new leadership pushed BVLOS rulemaking and airworthiness pathways to “unleash” commercial possibilities [6] [2]. Sources present these as concurrent but distinct priorities rather than a single coherent doctrine, reflecting competing agendas — national security and industrial policy on one side, aviation‑safety and commercialization on the other [3] [6].
6. International and market ripple effects: supply chains and standards wars
Observers and industry analysts expect U.S. security measures to ripple globally: the Countering CCP Drones debate and NDAA‑driven controls will pressure supply chains and push markets toward domestic or allied suppliers, while international standards (ICAO, EASA U‑space) and NPRMs for BVLOS aim to harmonize operational norms — creating simultaneous market segmentation and technical convergence [10] [4].
7. Limits of the reporting and open questions
Available sources document rulemaking proposals, statutory deadlines and procurement guidance but do not provide final, universal policy outcomes across every agency or a definitive post‑2025 status for specific companies absent the December 2025 reviews [5] [9]. Sources do not detail internal targeting criteria for lethal military drone strikes or whether classification standards for kinetic targeting changed under subsequent administrations; those topics are not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting).
Bottom line
Standards governing what drones can do in U.S. airspace have shifted toward enabling large‑scale BVLOS operations through new FAA parts and processes, while national‑security policy has tightened what hardware federal agencies may buy or fund — creating a bifurcated regime where operational liberalization coexists with procurement restriction [2] [6] [3] [1].