How do host‑nation cost‑sharing agreements with the U.S. differ between Germany, Italy, and the UK?
Executive summary
Host‑nation cost‑sharing arrangements with the United States are layered and country‑specific: Germany’s contributions have historically been large and often take the form of in‑kind support (land, infrastructure and services) in addition to cash; Italy has at times been portrayed as covering a large share of operating costs for U.S. forces on its soil (historical figures cited around 41 percent); and the United Kingdom’s cost sharing is embedded in long‑standing bilateral agreements and NATO frameworks, with additional political and legal complexities tied to nuclear sharing and archived maintenance accords . These arrangements are not standardized across allies, are tracked unevenly by U.S. agencies, and remain subject to political bargaining — including proposals to demand far larger allied payments — which analysts warn could strain alliances .
1. Germany: heavy in‑kind support, land and legacy bargains
Germany hosts the largest U.S. force footprint in Europe and has supplied substantial non‑cash support that complicates simple dollar tallies: U.S. analyses and GAO work stress that German contributions include the original provision of land and long‑term infrastructure that are rarely captured in annual host‑nation accounting, and U.S. think tanks note Germany provides a sizable share of the European basing picture . GAO and other reporting also emphasize that neither State nor Defense routinely monitors the full types and value of host‑nation support — meaning Germany’s true contribution is often understated in headline figures even as Washington periodically pressures Berlin for more payments .
2. Italy: sizable historical cash and operating shares, but murky current totals
Multiple sources cite Italy among the more significant European contributors to U.S. stationing costs, with historical U.S. government data and press reporting placing Italy’s share of certain operating costs in the region at roughly 41 percent — a figure used repeatedly in comparative discussions — but that percentage stems from older accounting snapshots and mixes categories of support, so it should not be read as a single, contemporary line item that perfectly maps to today’s budgets . Like Germany, Italy provides access to facilities and has existing SOFAs that permit bilateral arrangements; however, GAO reporting warns that the categories (facility construction, pollution abatement, local payrolls, taxes, and damage claims) are treated inconsistently across bilateral deals, making cross‑country comparisons imprecise .
3. United Kingdom: formal bilateral accords, NATO frameworks and nuclear‑sharing overlay
The UK’s cost‑sharing relationship with the United States is grounded in long archival bilateral agreements and NATO instruments; the National Archives holds records of maintenance and cost accords, and the broader NATO SOFA establishes the legal template under which supplementary, country‑specific cost sharing has evolved . The UK is also part of NATO nuclear‑sharing arrangements that add a strategic layer to its hosting relationship . BBC reporting frames NATO common funding contributions on the basis of national income (separate from host‑nation bilateral support) and lists the UK as a major NATO budget contributor, but that is a distinct ledger from direct host‑nation support for U.S. bases .
4. Commonalities, monitoring gaps and political leverage
Across Germany, Italy and the UK, the legal basis for U.S. presence is SOFAs or NATO supplements, and many forms of support are bilateral rather than codified in a single multilateral contract; GAO specifically flagged that State and Defense do not systematically track the range and value of host contributions, and that increased peacetime cost sharing can often be achieved without renegotiating SOFAs . Political actors in Washington have periodically floated aggressive cost demands (for example “cost plus 50”) that would dramatically raise allied bills — proposals that analysts warn could damage alliances and are difficult to implement given the logistics of relocating forces .
5. What reporting does not settle and why it matters
Available public sources provide snapshots and historical percentages but do not yield a single, current comparative ledger that cleanly shows what Germany, Italy and the UK each pay in cash or in quantified in‑kind value in 2025–26; multiple authors note the existence of unquantified contributions (land, prior infrastructure, and domestic offsets) and inconsistent accounting across agencies, which means any firm ranking based on headline percentages risks misrepresenting the full economic picture . Policymakers and analysts therefore debate not only the arithmetic but the political acceptability of shifting costs — a debate shaped as much by strategic considerations and bargaining leverage as by balance‑sheet math .