Fact check: How does Hamas use stolen aid to fund its military operations?

1. Dramatic footage and accusations: a visual claim that sparks policy debates

A CENTCOM-published video circulated in November 2025 showing what it described as Hamas operatives looting a humanitarian aid truck in northern Khan Yunis has become a focal point for claims that Hamas diverts aid to support military activity; the video’s immediacy and dramatic framing have driven media and official responses ^[1]. Proponents of the view that Hamas systematically exploits aid treat such footage as illustrative evidence that insurgent groups can and do intercept supplies, reinforcing calls for stricter convoy protection and alternative delivery mechanisms. Critics caution, however, that a single video does not establish pattern or scale, and note that the condition of the driver and chain-of-custody details remain unreported in the clip’s release, leaving important factual gaps ^[1]. The publication date of the video — November 1, 2025 — places it after several earlier government assessments that found no systematic theft, intensifying debates about changing ground realities ^{[1] [2]}.

2. U.S. analyses that undercut the “systematic theft” narrative

A USAID-led Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance review, reported in July 2025, examined 156 incidents of theft or loss involving U.S.-funded supplies and concluded it found no evidence that Hamas systematically benefited from such incidents, challenging arguments used to justify private armed escort operations for aid ^[2]. This government analysis is cited by multiple outlets noting the absence of confirmed diversion of U.S.-funded aid to Hamas, and it has been invoked to argue that wholesale accusations risk misdirecting policy and resources away from proven humanitarian channels. The USAID Office of Inspector General has separately designated Gaza as a high-risk environment for potential diversion, highlighting the complexity: acknowledgement of risk does not equate to confirmed, routine siphoning by Hamas ^[4]. These official findings have been contested by other government and NGO statements, underscoring how different methodologies and evidentiary thresholds produce divergent conclusions ^{[5] [4]}.

3. Reports claiming widespread looting and diversion: scale and sources differ

Several media and policy pieces published across mid-2025 assert that a large share of aid entering Gaza has been looted or diverted, with figures such as “nearly 90%” or “85%” cited in some outlets to convey widespread interception by operatives and criminal networks allegedly tied to Hamas ^{[3] [6]}. These accounts describe mechanisms including direct seizure of convoys, black-market resale, and taxation of distributions, portraying diversion as a structural barrier to aid effectiveness. Analysts advancing this view point to recurrent incidents, market-level distortions, and on-the-ground testimonies to argue for securitized alternatives to relief delivery. Skeptics counter that methodology, anecdotal sampling, and potential political motivations behind some numbers complicate their reliability, and they highlight the need for transparent, verifiable incident tracking to move from assertion to demonstrable pattern ^{[3] [6]}.

4. Denials, counter-claims, and narratives of motive: contesting the story

Hamas has publicly denied allegations of looting and diversion, labeling such reports “baseless” and framing them as part of a systematic disinformation campaign aimed at justifying military or policy measures against Gaza ^[7]. Alternative narratives from some commentators and regional outlets suggest that claims of massive theft may be used to obscure other actors’ roles or to rationalize restrictions that exacerbate civilian suffering; one article argued the looting narrative itself could be manufactured to cover state actions that contribute to shortages ^[8]. These competing claims demonstrate that questions about motive and information warfare are central: when accusations intersect with active conflict, disentangling factual evidence from strategic messaging becomes a core analytical challenge ^{[7] [8]}.

5. What the evidence does and does not establish: a tight summary of the facts

Across the sources, the evidence establishes that individual incidents of looting and diversion have occurred, including filmed seizures and reported market diversions, but it does not establish a universally accepted, independently verified pattern of systematic, large-scale redirection of U.S.-funded humanitarian aid to Hamas. The USAID review of 156 incidents found no instances crediting Hamas with benefiting, even as other reports describe high percentages of diverted goods entering Gaza ^{[2] [3]}. This contrast highlights differences in data scope, definitions of “diversion,” and evidentiary standards: official audits track U.S.-funded items and require corroborated chains of custody, while some media accounts synthesize anecdote, market observation, and local testimony into broader claims ^{[2] [3]}.

6. Policy implications and unresolved gaps: what to watch next

Given the contested evidence, policy responses range from bolstering guarded relief corridors and alternative distribution models to maintaining support for existing humanitarian agencies pending further verification; each approach carries trade-offs for civilian access and security. Key unresolved gaps include transparent incident-level data with verifiable chains of custody, independent forensic audits of aid flows, and consistent methodologies across agencies and media so that claims can be compared directly. Watch for follow-up investigations, forensic audits, and multi-agency incident databases that could either corroborate episodic looting as isolated incidents or document a systemic pattern; those future findings will determine whether current disputes reflect evidence gaps or a genuine shift in how aid is handled and misused ^{[1] [2] [5]}.