How did Israel sabotage hamas phones
Executive summary
Israel has used a mix of covert human operations, targeted explosive devices in communications hardware, cyber and signals intelligence penetration, and attacks on physical infrastructure to disrupt adversary communications—tactics documented in past Israeli operations and alleged in more recent incidents—while precise attribution for many recent device attacks remains publicly contested [1] [2] [3]. Hamas and other groups counter that many Israeli attempts to penetrate their networks have failed, and some of Gaza’s communications have proven resilient because fighters relied on hardwired tunnel lines that are hard to access or trace [4] [5].
1. Historical precedent: explosive phones and human infiltration
The most-cited model for sabotaging adversary phones dates to 1996, when Israel’s security services are widely reported to have killed Hamas bombmaker Yahya Ayyash by placing explosives in his mobile phone—a textbook example that shows how human intelligence can be used to plant lethal or disabling devices in handsets [1]. Subsequent investigative reporting and court cases have detailed operations where operatives posed as journalists or used break-ins and human assets to plant devices or gather access, reinforcing that human infiltration remains a core method [2] [6].
2. Cyber and SIGINT: clandestine access to phones and networks
Israeli agencies are described by analysts as “best in class” at computer network operations and clandestine penetration of phones and systems, developing multiple streams of access—SIGINT, network tapping and human sources—to monitor and, in some cases, manipulate adversary communications [3]. News accounts indicate Israel has attempted to penetrate Hamas and Hezbollah communications repeatedly, with varying degrees of success; Hamas officials have publicly claimed some Israeli hacking efforts failed, underscoring the uneven outcomes of cyber operations [4] [7].
3. Physical infrastructure attacks and cutting lines
Beyond handset-focused operations, Israel has also targeted broader communications infrastructure. Palestinian telecom operators in Gaza have accused Israel of deliberately disconnecting fiber and other cables that run through Israeli-controlled areas, an action that can produce widespread outages and severely degrade cell and internet service in Gaza [8]. Such infrastructure targeting is a less dramatic but more scalable means of degrading adversary communications than device-level sabotage.
4. Limits imposed by hardwired tunnel networks and tactics to evade surveillance
Hamas’s use of hardwired phone lines embedded in Gaza’s tunnel network presents a concrete limit to Israeli ability to monitor or sabotage communications remotely; intelligence reporting found Hamas planners used those hardwired lines to coordinate over extended periods precisely because they were much harder for Israeli or US signals intelligence to detect and penetrate [9] [5]. That operational choice has constrained the effectiveness of both cyber and radio-based intrusion efforts.
5. Recent device explosions and contested attribution
In 2024 there were high-profile explosions of pagers and other wireless devices in Lebanon and Syria, and Western reporting linked such attacks to covert Israeli operations by analogy to earlier methods; media and analysts note the pattern is consistent with past Israeli tactics, though public, incontrovertible proof and official admissions are absent, and adversaries frequently attribute the strikes to Israel even while accusing it of failure in other domains [10] [11] [2]. Open-source accounts therefore mix firm historical examples with plausible but sometimes unconfirmed attributions for recent incidents.
6. How to read the mosaic: capabilities, deniability, and reporting gaps
Taken together, the reporting shows Israel possesses a toolbox—human infiltration to plant devices, covert SIGINT/cyber access to phones and networks, and the capacity to sever or degrade physical links—that can be applied to sabotage adversary communications, but public records are fragmentary and adversaries often deny or claim success or failure depending on the narrative [3] [4] [8]. Where Hamas relied on hardwired tunnel phones and tradecraft to evade detection, many Israeli technical and human-intelligence approaches are less effective, explaining both successful operations in the past and high-profile failures or contested outcomes more recently [9] [5] [12].