How did the Finnish HX competition compare lifecycle cost estimates for Gripen E and F-35?

Checked on December 18, 2025
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Executive summary

Finland’s HX competition concluded that, when measured across acquisition, sustainment and lifecycle development within Finland’s chosen financial framework, the F‑35A was the most cost‑effective option—even though many public comparisons highlight Gripen E’s lower per‑flight‑hour estimates and Saab campaigned on affordability [1] [2]. Finnish authorities reported that none of the bidders produced operating‑and‑maintenance cost figures that were “significantly” lower than the others, and the F‑35 met Finland’s budgetary and supply‑security criteria [2] [3].

1. How Finland framed “lifecycle cost” in the HX decision

The Finnish competition explicitly evaluated more than sticker price: it weighed acquisition cost, operating and maintenance expenditures, lifecycle development expenses and industrial‑security considerations against defined capability requirements and a multi‑year budget envelope, and concluded the F‑35’s operating, maintenance and lifecycle development costs “fit within the planned budget” and made it the most cost‑effective solution for Finland [1] [3]. The Ministry of Defence and Finnish Air Force tied lifecycle economics to capabilities such as situational awareness, internal sensors and stealth, effectively accepting higher complexity if it paid off operationally and across long‑term sustainment [1].

2. The Gripen E’s cost narrative versus the Finnish findings

Saab marketed Gripen E on a platform of lower acquisition and sustainment burdens—industry‑level talking points often cite low hourly flight costs (some open‑source claims put Gripen operating costs far below F‑35 estimates) and the aircraft’s suitability for dispersed operations from austere strips [2] [4]. But in Finland’s assessment, those claims did not translate into a decisive lifecycle advantage: the Finnish report and public statements stressed that none of the final bids showed markedly lower operating costs, undermining the simple narrative that Gripen would be far cheaper over its life [2] [5].

3. Reconciling contrasting public comparisons (flight‑hour vs lifecycle)

Many headline comparisons fixate on per‑flight‑hour figures—widely circulated numbers claim Gripen E can cost $8,000–$10,000 per hour against hypothetical F‑35 hours in the $30,000 range—but Finland’s process moved the conversation beyond isolated hourly estimates to total package economics, including weapons, training, spare‑parts pipelines and local industrial participation, areas where the F‑35 bid scored well and where Finland believed long‑term risks were manageable [4] [1]. Independent forum commentary and analysts warn that export‑claim flight‑hour figures often don’t survive scrutiny in procurement contexts, and Finland’s evaluators appear to have discounted headline hourly gaps in favor of complete lifecycle modeling [5] [2].

4. Political, industrial and supply‑security angles that affected lifecycle calculus

Cost estimates in HX were inseparable from non‑price factors: Finnish officials cited security of supply, industrial participation and the ability to integrate the fighter into national defense networks—criteria where Lockheed Martin’s F‑35 package promised production and supply roles that reduced perceived lifecycle risk [3]. Conversely, analysts and national commentators flagged potential hidden transition costs—switching from Swedish to U.S. supply chains or changing secure datalink infrastructures—that could alter long‑run economics, a caution raised in broader European debates about procurement tradeoffs [6].

5. Limits of the public record and what remains uncertain

The Finnish outcome relied on detailed tender submissions and lifecycle models that were summarized publicly, but granular line‑item transparency on assumptions (fuel prices, sortie rates, depot‑level maintenance frequency, inflation, upgrade paths) is limited in the public summaries; therefore, while Finland publicly declared the F‑35 most cost‑effective under its metrics, independent observers note that lifecycle comparisons are sensitive to those hidden assumptions and real‑world experience over decades will ultimately validate or refute the projections [1] [2] [3].

Want to dive deeper?
What specific lifecycle cost assumptions (sortie rates, service life, depot maintenance cycles) did Finland use in the HX tender modeling?
How have other countries’ long‑term sustainment costs for F‑35 and Gripen compared to their procurement time estimates (e.g., Switzerland, Brazil)?
What are the documented transition costs (training, supply chain, datalink security) when a country switches from Saab/European systems to U.S.-centric fighter infrastructure?