How did Iranian air-defence capability change after Israeli pre‑strikes and before Midnight Hammer?
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Executive summary
Israeli pre‑strikes and drone attacks in the weeks and days before Operation Midnight Hammer severely degraded Iran’s integrated air‑defence architecture—striking radars and many surface‑to‑air missile (SAM) launchers—which left Iranian SAMs largely absent during the U.S. B‑2 strike and allowed NATO‑quality air sorties to operate with little detected pushback [1] [2] [3]. Tehran later publicly announced rapid replacements and restorations of some systems, but independent reporting and post‑strike analyses describe a significant attrition of early‑warning and long‑range SAM layers that Iran was still scrambling to patch before Midnight Hammer [4] [5] [1].
1. Pre‑strike campaign: focused attacks on sensors and launchers
Reporting across western and regional outlets attributes the initial collapse of Iran’s layered air defence to deliberate Israeli operations that targeted radars and SAM batteries with drones, precision munitions, and low‑signature stand‑off strikes, producing “empty” S‑300 sites and smashed early‑warning radars that degraded Iran’s ability to detect and cue long‑range interceptors [6] [1] [2]. Multiple accounts say Israeli operators neutralized dozens of launchers and early‑warning nodes in the run‑up, a campaign designed not necessarily to destroy every missile but to blind and fragment the integrated network [2] [6].
2. Operational effect during the 12‑day war: aerial superiority and scarce SAM engagement
The practical result was Israeli and allied air forces operating with de facto air superiority for the duration of the 12‑day conflict; videos and analyst reports showed anti‑aircraft artillery engage aircraft while SAM engagements were notably sparse, and Israeli jets reportedly conducted strikes across Iran with few losses, underscoring a shortfall in Iran’s medium‑to‑long‑range SAM coverage [1] [2] [7]. Iranian commanders later attributed some successes to point defenses and downing of many UAVs, but most independent observers emphasize the inability of Iran’s higher‑tier systems to contest the skies effectively during that window [8] [1].
3. Clearing the path for Midnight Hammer: a two‑day degradation before the B‑2s
Several reports describe a concentrated Israeli effort in the 48 hours before Midnight Hammer to disable southern Iranian air defences specifically to permit U.S. B‑2 ingress, including coordinated strikes and a U.S. provided targeting list, and U.S. and Israeli fighters reportedly probed air defences first with no detected Iranian SAM fire when the B‑2s arrived [9] [3] [7]. Western and open‑source accounts therefore conclude that the combination of earlier attrition and last‑minute suppression produced the operational conditions for the stealth bombers to strike with minimal intercepted defensive response [3] [6].
4. Tehran’s response: repairs, public claims and narratives of resilience
Iranian officials publicly announced rapid replacement and restoration of damaged air‑defence systems and later showcased new or Russian‑made systems and domestic upgrades, framing recovery as swift and intentional to reassure domestic and regional audiences [4] [10] [5]. Independent reporting and analysts, however, note that replacement is not the same as restored integration—reconstituting sensors, networks, trained crews, and layered command‑and‑control takes time—so Tehran’s claims of “restoration” must be read against evidence of persistent gaps identified by outside analysts [8] [1].
5. What remains uncertain: numbers, locations and covert operations
Open‑source accounts differ on exact attrition figures—some outlets report roughly 120 launchers destroyed or disabled while Iranian statements contest the scale and stress successful interceptions—yet there is a clear consensus that Iran’s higher‑tier, long‑range SAM and early‑warning capacity was degraded sufficiently to permit sustained allied air operations; however, precise inventories, covert losses, and classified U.S./Israeli assessments remain unavailable in public reporting [2] [1] [3]. Reporting biases and national messaging—Israeli emphasis on “full air superiority” and Iranian focus on rapid repair—produce competing narratives shaped by operational secrecy and political agendas [3] [4].
6. Strategic implications: short‑term vulnerability, long‑term rebuilding
In the short term, the degradation allowed allied strikes—including Midnight Hammer—to hit hardened nuclear sites with limited detected SAM engagement, changing the tactical calculus inside Iran and prompting accelerated repair programs and procurement overtures toward Russia and China; in the longer term, Iran’s ability to rebuild an integrated, resilient air‑defence posture depends on access to advanced sensors, integrated command systems, and time to train crews—factors state media claims cannot by themselves negate [3] [11] [2].