How does the Israeli military use technology to reduce civilian casualties in Gaza?
Executive summary
Israel combines advanced sensors, artificial intelligence, precision-guided munitions and human review to try to lower civilian harm in Gaza, using tools that range from AI-assisted target databases to small reconnaissance robots and warning systems [1] [2] [3]. Advocates argue these technologies and tactics (text/phone warnings, “roof-knocks,” pauses and precision weapons) are unprecedented attempts to protect civilians [3] [4], while critics contend AI and digital tools can magnify errors, obscure accountability and have coincided with very high civilian death tolls [5] [6] [7].
1. AI and decision-support: speed and pattern-matching combined with human judgment
The IDF has deployed AI-driven systems—reported under names like “Gospel” or “Habsora”—that ingest imagery, communications and other data to surface likely targets and recommend munitions, with the military saying humans make the final decisions at key junctions [1] [8]. Supporters say AI’s speed and pattern recognition let forces select more precise timing, munitions and angles of attack to avoid civilians, and have correlated with changes in the makeup of casualties over time according to some analyses [2] [1]. Opponents and experts warn such systems can accelerate targeting, flatten judgment into data-driven lists and blur lines of accountability, especially when operational details are opaque [8] [7].
2. Sensors, drones and small robots for better situational awareness
A suite of aerial and ground sensors—from Xtend UAV counter‑drone systems to throwable ground units like Elbit’s Iris—are used to map urban terrain, tunnel networks and confined spaces so forces can identify combatants without entering populated rooms, theoretically reducing risk to both soldiers and civilians [2]. Reporting also points to deployment of armed “sniper” or small drones in Gaza, with eyewitness accounts and some manufacturer footage suggesting their existence even as official confirmations are limited [9]. These tools increase information; their effectiveness for limiting civilian harm depends on data quality and how commanders act on what they see [2] [9].
3. Precision munitions and tactical practices aimed at limiting blast and collateral damage
Israeli forces have emphasized use of precision-guided munitions including small-diameter bombs and choices of weapon effects intended to limit blast and structural damage, alongside diving-bomb tactics when air supremacy allows it, all aimed at concentrating force on military objects and sparing nearby civilians where feasible [3]. The military also reports careful pre‑strike intelligence and selection of munitions to “achieve the military objective while minimizing collateral damage” [10] [3]. Analysts note, however, that even precision weapons cause severe damage in dense urban settings and proportionality assessments require data the IDF has not always provided publicly [6].
4. Communication, warnings and operational pauses as non-kinetic mitigation
The IDF has widely used advance warnings—phone calls, text messages, leaflet drops, and so‑called “roof‑knocking”—and even announced pauses to allow civilians to evacuate, measures Israel and some commentators claim reduced the number of civilians in certain zones [3] [4]. These methods are cited by advocates as historic levels of mitigation; critics point to logistical limits (power cuts, damaged communications infrastructure) and argue warnings can be ineffective or impossible to act on in Gaza’s constrained environment [3] [5].
5. Data, cloud services and the transparency problem
The Israeli military’s growing reliance on cloud computing and commercial AI capacity—documented in reporting on contracts and external providers—has multiplied targeting speed and scale, raising questions about oversight, error propagation and who bears responsibility when digital tools produce faulty outputs [11] [8]. Human Rights Watch and other investigators have documented instances where digital tools rely on incomplete or degraded data (e.g., cell data after power cuts), increasing the risk that commanders will wrongly conclude areas are clear of civilians [5].
6. Balance of outcomes: mitigation claims versus alarm over civilian toll
Proponents point to new technical means and operational precautions as an effort to minimize harm and to instances where technology enabled targeted operations [3] [2]. Yet independent analysts, human rights groups and investigative reporting argue that the same tools can accelerate targeting, obscure decision chains, and have not prevented very large numbers of civilian deaths and destruction—meaning technology is not a panacea and its real-world effect depends on doctrine, data quality and transparency [6] [7] [5]. Public reporting limitations and contested casualty data make definitive assessment difficult; the available sources document both mitigation measures and serious concerns about their implementation and consequences [1] [5].