Despite Putin’s statements, the Kremlin will not abandon Kherson and Zaporizhia; analysts say territorial concessions are unlikely
Executive summary
Russian public messaging and battlefield reporting show Moscow staking political and military claims over Kherson and Zaporizhia while ground fighting is active but not producing clear advances; multiple Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessments record “continued offensive operations” in Kherson and western Zaporizhia but explicitly note that Russian forces “did not advance” on repeated dates (Dec. 1–8) [1] [2] [3] [4]. Kremlin rhetoric — including Putin’s public remarks about occupation policy and Russian officials’ statements — aligns with an unwillingness to cede those territories while Russian sources and milbloggers describe sustained strikes on civilian infrastructure in Kherson and Zaporizhia [2] [1] [3].
1. Kremlin posture: public resolve and occupation-building
President Putin and occupation administrators are publicly projecting consolidation in Kherson and Zaporizhia: Putin emphasized policies aimed at exploiting occupied regions (including demographic and economic measures) and occupation officials reported outreach to foreign partners to integrate Kherson into trade corridors and labor programs — a sign Moscow is treating these oblasts as enduring assets, not temporary gains [2] [5]. ISW notes Putin reiterated his “commitment to his original war aims and unwillingness to compromise” in interviews, reinforcing official resistance to territorial concessions [6].
2. Battlefield reality: active attacks, limited territorial gains
Repeated ISW daily assessments document that Russian forces “continued offensive operations” in the Kherson direction and in western Zaporizhia across early December but repeatedly did not make confirmed advances (Dec. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8), indicating fighting without decisive breakthroughs [1] [4] [6] [3] [5] [2]. Russian and pro‑Kremlin outlets likewise claim tactical successes and losses inflicted on Ukrainian forces, but ISW’s pattern of “attacks without advance” tempers those claims [7] [8].
3. Targeting of civilian infrastructure: a politico-military tactic
Milbloggers and Ukrainian reports cited by ISW describe strikes on power, transport and civilian sites in Kherson and Zaporizhia — including alleged calls within Russian online circles to target heat and medical infrastructure in Kherson City — suggesting an effort to weaken urban resilience and to entrench control through attrition and administrative pressure [1] [3] [5]. ISW also reports Russian strikes caused nationwide energy outages, and pro‑Russian outlets chronicle hypersonic and cruise missile strikes across multiple regions, underscoring a campaign that mixes front‑line pressure and strategic strikes [5] [9].
4. Messaging and domestic politics: narratives that foreclose concessions
Russian domestic voices tied to the state — from the State Duma to propaganda outlets — articulate a narrative of maximalist aims and readiness to use Crimea as a staging ground for further operations, while hosts of pro‑Kremlin media portray negotiations as incompatible with Russia’s interests [6] [10]. That discourse raises the domestic political cost of concessions: admitting loss or withdrawing would contradict repeated official claims of permanence and successful occupation policies [2] [6].
5. Alternative perspectives and reporting limits
Pro‑Russian outlets in the dataset assert battlefield victories and attribute heavy losses to Ukrainian forces, whereas ISW provides a more cautious operational readout noting activity without confirmed territorial gain — representing competing narratives in the available reporting [7] [1]. Available sources do not mention negotiations terms, external diplomatic pressure specifics, Ukrainian operational intent beyond frontline reporting, or independent on‑the‑ground verification of many pro‑Russian claims; limitations in sources mean key questions about force sustainability, logistics, and longer‑term political calculations remain open (not found in current reporting).
6. What this implies for the near term
Given Moscow’s public hardline posture and the pattern of sustained attacks without clear breakthrough, the most likely short‑term outcome in the sources is continued fighting coupled with administrative consolidation efforts rather than negotiated territorial concessions. ISW’s repeated observations that Russian forces “did not advance” while continuing attacks suggest stalemate dynamics on the ground even as political signals indicate Russia will resist relinquishing control [1] [4] [2].
Limitations: this analysis relies solely on the provided ISW reports and pro‑Kremlin outlets; independent, on‑the‑ground verification and diplomatic records are not included in the dataset and therefore are not assessed here (not found in current reporting).