What is the likelyhood that the next US War will be faught on the homeland
Executive summary
The next major U.S. war being fought as a classic, large-scale, conventional conflict on American soil remains unlikely; however, authoritative U.S. strategy and threat assessments now treat the homeland as a realistic target for hybrid, cyber, space and stand-off kinetic attacks, raising the probability of significant hostile operations against U.S. infrastructure or territory short of full invasion [1] [2] [3]. Analysts and institutions give even odds to high‑impact contingencies that could draw the United States into major wars abroad, while official doctrine has elevated homeland defense to top priority precisely because adversaries’ long‑range and non‑kinetic capabilities have improved [4] [1].
1. Why defense planners now assume the homeland is at risk
The 2026 National Defense Strategy explicitly lists defending the U.S. homeland as its first priority, reversing decades in which deterrence abroad dominated planning and signaling that decisionmakers view adversaries as having “more direct military threats” to the homeland through conventional, nuclear, space, cyber, and electromagnetic means [1] [5]. This doctrinal shift is not rhetorical: service and homeland agencies are debating budgets and force mixes because forces optimized for an Indo‑Pacific fight may not be the right mix for maritime, cyber and critical‑infrastructure defense inside the Western Hemisphere [1] [6].
2. What kinds of attacks are now judged plausible on U.S. soil
Observers and service studies focus less on an amphibious invasion and more on distributed, asymmetric operations: drone incursions at military bases, cyber‑attacks on ports and energy infrastructure, targeted strikes against offshore facilities, and the use of unmanned surface/underwater vehicles or electromagnetic tools to create cascading disruption—scenarios rehearsed in military planning and think‑tank reports [2] [3]. The Institute of Future Conflict documents hundreds of drone incursions into military installations in 2024, underscoring how affordable commercial systems have already reached U.S. targets [2].
3. How likely is a full‑scale war on U.S. soil?
No sourced reporting claims a high probability of a Great‑Power conventional invasion of the continental United States; instead, analysts warn of higher risks of “direct military threats” in the form of long‑range strikes, cyber campaigns, or hybrid operations that could hit the homeland during broader conflicts [1] [4]. The Council on Foreign Relations puts contingencies such as a Taiwan Strait crisis or Russia‑NATO clashes at “even chance” of occurring and stresses their potential to draw the U.S. into direct conflict abroad—not necessarily fighting on U.S. streets—but their downstream effects could include attacks on U.S. infrastructure or territories [4].
4. Domestic political turmoil and non‑state threats change the equation
Political instability at home is itself flagged as a risk vector: some risk assessments argue U.S. domestic fractures and the erosion of democratic checks amplify vulnerabilities and may complicate mobilization or deterrence, while domestic extremist radicalization—especially tied to foreign conflicts—remains a prime homeland security concern for 2026, notably threats to Jewish communities and Israel‑linked sites [7] [8]. These dynamics make sustained, coordinated homeland defense more brittle even if the basic military balance deters invasion [7] [8].
5. Bottom line: low probability of full invasion, rising probability of damaging attacks on homeland elements
The best synthesis of official strategy, military scenario work and threat reporting is categorical about direction but cautious about magnitude: the U.S. is less likely to face a classic, state‑on‑state war fought across its cities and heartland, but more likely to face episodic, high‑impact attacks on military sites, energy and maritime infrastructure, space and cyber systems, and diaspora communities—threats that could occur in isolation or as part of wider wars that draw the United States in [1] [2] [3] [4] [8]. Public reporting does not provide quantifiable odds; available sources justify elevating homeland defenses and interagency readiness precisely because these lower‑probability but high‑consequence attacks are now considered credible [1] [2].