What's the likelihood of a bigger war in the next 10 years?
Executive summary
Global expert and institutional reporting converges on a heightened probability of significant interstate and regional wars over the next decade: risk surveys and watchdogs flag multiple hotspots and systemic drivers that raise the odds, yet most analysts stop short of predicting an inevitable world war and instead point to a patchwork of likely regional conflagrations and crisis cascades [1] [2] [3]. Hidden political drivers—shifts in U.S. policy, great‑power competition, and domestic fragilities—raise tail risks even as economic constraints and nuclear deterrence limit the probability of all‑out major‑power war [4] [5] [6].
1. The landscape: many local wars, few agreed odds on a single big war
Institutional risk surveys and watchlists show dozens of flashpoints where violence is likely to intensify—Africa’s fragile states, the Middle East, and latent interstate rivalries—making regional “bigger” wars a realistic near‑term prospect [2] [7] [8]. At the same time, expert polling reveals divergence on whether this will scale into a great‑power war: Atlantic Council foresight respondents grew markedly more worried about direct Russia–NATO or China–Taiwan conflict in ten years, but that is a probability judgment, not consensus certainty [3]. The Global Risks Report synthesizes hundreds of expert views that see rising risk overall rather than a settled forecast of world war [1].
2. Principal drivers that push risk upward
Several structurally reinforcing dynamics appear across reporting: the erosion of norms and check‑and‑balance institutions in key states, weaponized economic policy and trade, intensifying climate stress, proliferating proxies and non‑state actors, and rapid technological change (AI, drones) that lowers the threshold for crisis [4] [5] [6]. These forces magnify localized disputes—e.g., Ethiopia–Eritrea or renewed Syria or Lebanon wars—into regional conflagrations through alliances, militia spillover, and weakened mediation capacity [9] [10] [7].
3. Constraints and stabilizers that cap escalation
Nuclear deterrence, the economic costs of large conventional wars, and the continued—but fraying—interest of major powers in managing escalation act as brakes on a full‑scale great‑power war, and many analysts caution that the most likely near‑term outcome is a continued patchwork of high‑intensity regional conflicts rather than a global conflagration [6] [5]. Institutions and diplomatic channels still interpose: even amid rising risk, Crisis Group and ACLED emphasize opportunities for mediation and crisis management that can prevent local fights morphing into wider wars if political will and resources are mobilized [9] [2].
4. Political agency and hidden agendas that skew risk assessments
Forecasting is politicized: some analyses elevate the role of U.S. domestic politics—arguing American retrenchment or destabilizing leadership choices are primary risk multipliers—while others stress structural shifts like resource scarcity or great‑power realignment [4] [5]. These differences matter because framing drives policy responses: emphasizing U.S. institutional decay or a “Trump effect” pushes prescriptions toward domestic governance fixes, whereas highlighting climate or state fragility points to development and humanitarian investments [4] [7].
5. Bottom line probability and uncertainty
Synthesizing expert surveys and watchlists yields a sober assessment: the likelihood of some larger regional wars over the next ten years is high and rising, while the probability of an immediate full‑scale great‑power war remains significant enough to merit active prevention but not so certain that it should be treated as a foregone conclusion—experts offer elevated but varied odds, not unanimity [1] [3] [2]. Policymakers and publics should therefore prepare for a decade of intensified conflict risk, prioritize diplomacy, conflict‑mitigation funding, and contingency planning, and recognize that hidden political incentives can both understate and overstate these risks depending on source and agenda [6] [4].