What intelligence-sharing partnerships target maritime drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Gulf of Venezuela?
Executive summary
Multiple formal intelligence- and information‑sharing partnerships target maritime drug trafficking in the Caribbean and approaches to Venezuela: the U.S.-led Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF‑S) and Operation Martillo, multilateral projects such as the EU‑backed SEACOP, and international mechanisms including the UNODC‑WCO Container Control Program and Europe’s MAOC‑N. U.S. military and Coast Guard activity—backed by JIATF‑S liaison officers from roughly 20 countries—has surged in 2025 and altered both tactics and partners in the region [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].
1. U.S. hubs: JIATF‑S and Operation Martillo — the connective tissue
The United States leads the most visible intelligence‑sharing effort through Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF‑S), which coordinates military and law‑enforcement information to “target, detect and monitor illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains” and in 2025 hosted liaison officers from about 20 countries, including Colombia and Mexico [1]. Operation Martillo is a long‑running multinational effort that works with JIATF‑S and Western Hemisphere partners to patrol coastal waters and share actionable intelligence for interdiction along Central America and Caribbean routes [2].
2. Regional capacity building: SEACOP’s quiet but steady role
The European Union‑backed Sea‑borne Enforcement and Cooperation Programme (SEACOP) has, over a decade, built a network for intelligence sharing, inter‑agency coordination and training across 13 Caribbean countries to tackle maritime trafficking. SEACOP’s emphasis is on strengthening national authorities that otherwise lack sustained maritime capacities, making it a force multiplier for information flows in the region [3].
3. Global tools and port‑level intelligence: UNODC‑WCO and MAOC‑N
Port and container intelligence is handled through programs that reach into the Caribbean: the UNODC‑WCO Container Control Program establishes Port Control Units to improve inspections and share data; as of 2022 there were 22 PCUs in Latin America and the Caribbean, though only six in the Caribbean proper [4]. Europe’s Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre‑Narcotics (MAOC‑N) pools naval and air assets and intelligence to tackle illicit shipping to Europe and has relevance for Caribbean‑Europe routes [4].
4. Coast Guard and law‑enforcement partners — the on‑the‑water investigators
U.S. Coast Guard cutters and Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations remain central to interdiction and evidence collection, conducting seizures and working with regional partners to offload large cocaine hauls (for example a 2.8‑ton seizure in the Eastern Caribbean credited to joint AMO operations) and continuing law‑enforcement missions even as U.S. military roles expand [6] [7].
5. The 2025 military surge: new task forces, strikes and information sharing
In 2025 the U.S. created a higher‑visibility military posture — including a new Counternarcotics Task Force and wider naval deployments under names like Operation Southern Spear — that integrates military intelligence and has been justified as targeting maritime trafficking tied to Venezuela. That posture included lethal strikes on suspected drug vessels and an expanded intelligence apparatus, which supporters say disrupts maritime flows while critics warn it blends law‑enforcement with military operations [1] [8] [9].
6. Tactics shift and intelligence limits: traffickers adapt, intelligence is uneven
Reporting shows traffickers responded to maritime pressure by shifting to air routes and other methods; analysts note that a focus on maritime interdiction might push smugglers to aerial smuggling or remotely operated narco‑vessels, a dynamic that complicates the value of maritime intelligence alone [1] [5]. The Atlantic and other commentators highlight that the Coast Guard historically produced most courtroom‑usable evidence, and that lethal military actions risk undermining criminal investigations and regional cooperation [10].
7. Political friction and partner choices shape intelligence flows
Intelligence sharing in the Caribbean is not purely technical; political alignments matter. Some European states and Latin American governments have criticized U.S. strikes and reduced cooperation in certain channels, while others have authorized temporary US facilities (e.g., Dominican Republic hosting U.S. operations) that expand information sharing and operational reach [11] [12] [9].
8. What reporting does not specify
Available sources do not mention a single consolidated intelligence database accessible to all Caribbean states, nor do they provide a definitive list of every bilateral intelligence agreement between Caribbean governments and external partners; those details are not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting).
Limitations and competing views: sources document an expanding U.S. intelligence footprint and multilateral programs like SEACOP and UNODC‑WCO, but they disagree on outcomes. U.S. and allied accounts stress interdiction gains and large seizures; critics caution that militarized strikes risk legal, diplomatic and investigative costs and that traffickers adapt rapidly [6] [1] [10] [5].