What is the monthly casualty rate for the Russian army in the war in Ukraine

1. What the headline numbers say: concrete estimates and how they translate to a monthly rate

Ukraine’s General Staff and pro-Ukrainian aggregators report cumulative Russian casualties exceeding ~1.2 million by early January 2026, with roughly 1,100–1,200 casualties reported per day on some days, which, if averaged, corresponds to approximately 33,000–36,000 casualties per month ^{[1] [5] [2]}. NATO and allied public figures differ in emphasis: NATO Secretary-General–level comments quoted “up to 25,000 Russian soldiers being killed every month,” a killed-only framing that is narrower than “casualties” (killed + wounded) used elsewhere, and therefore not directly comparable to broad casualty tallies ^[2].

2. Independent and Western-analyst tallies: cumulative totals that imply monthly averages

Independent Western think tanks and trackers have offered cumulative estimates that imply monthly average rates in the tens of thousands; for example, CSIS’s aggregate assessments estimate about one million Russian casualties overall (including maybe ~250,000 killed), which averaged over the conflict’s multi-year duration implies monthly flows consistent with the high tens of thousands in the most intense periods ^{[3] [6]}. Media investigations cited by Russia Matters and outlets such as Meduza/Mediazona estimated hundreds of thousands killed (e.g., ~219,000 killed in some tallies), again implying substantial monthly attrition during peak periods ^{[7] [8]}.

3. Why published monthly figures diverge: definitions, sources and incentives

Discrepancies stem from differing definitions (casualties = killed + wounded vs killed only), time windows (daily spikes vs smoothed monthly averages), and source types (official Russian secrecy, Ukrainian General Staff tallies, open-source verifications, and intelligence leaks)—each carries biases and methodological limits; pro-Ukrainian tallies aim to document Russian losses for operational and informational effect, while Western agencies sometimes release conservative or classified assessments that vary by audience ^{[5] [9] [10]}.

4. Battlefield dynamics that drive monthly fluctuation

Monthly casualty rates are not static: intense offensives and urban fights drive spikes (examples cited include Avdiivka and continued battles in Donetsk), while quiet periods and rotational manpower intake change net flows; multiple sources note that Russian equipment losses and dismounted infantry assaults have produced cycles of heavy attrition, making any single-month figure a snapshot rather than a stable rate ^{[11] [6] [2]}.

5. Assessing reliability: what can and cannot be asserted from current reporting

Reporting convergence around tens of thousands of casualties per month is clear across multiple sources, but exact killed-versus-wounded splits, double-counting risk, and possible under- or over-reporting mean a precise monthly single number cannot be claimed with high confidence from the public record; sources such as Ukraine’s General Staff and independent trackers support an estimate range near 30,000–36,000 casualties/month in late 2025, while killed-only claims (for example, “up to 25,000 killed/month”) represent a different metric and likely an upper-end rhetorical assertion tied to political messaging ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

6. Bottom line and caveats

The most defensible, evidence-backed characterization is that Russian monthly casualties in late 2024–2025 frequently fell in the tens of thousands: many open-source and official Ukrainian tallies imply roughly 30,000–36,000 casualties per month, NATO and other officials have publicly cited killed-only figures up to ~25,000/month, and independent cumulative estimates (hundreds of thousands to ~1 million casualties overall) are consistent with these monthly magnitudes—yet all such figures should be read with caution given divergent methods, political incentives, and limits on independent verification ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}.