What are the rules of engagement for National Guard troops at the Capitol?

1. What people claimed and what investigators extracted — The contested narratives that matter

Public and official narratives offered competing claims: some accounts portrayed Guard units as constrained by a presidential or Pentagon refusal to act, while others cited procedural requirements and piecemeal approvals as the cause of delay; fact-finding shows both operational fragmentation and specific mission limits influenced Guard behavior. Investigations found that deployments were approved through a layered process involving the Secretary of Defense, Acting Secretary Christopher Miller, the Secretary of the Army, and local authorities, and that initial Guard authorization focused on traffic control and support rather than direct law-enforcement intervention ^{[1] [2] [3]}. The D.C. Guard’s unique legal status—reporting to the President but administered day-to-day through Defense Department channels—meant formal approval was required for civil disturbance missions, and that contributed to the delay and constrained ROE on January 6 ^{[2] [3]}.

2. How legal authorities shape what troops can do — Title 10, Title 32, and state active duty explained

Legal status at activation determines the scope of permissible law-enforcement activity: Title 10 federalized forces are generally barred from domestic law enforcement by the Posse Comitatus Act; Title 32 retains state control under federal funding and can allow law-enforcement support; state active duty places Guard members under a governor and typically permits police functions under state law. Analysts and official retrospectives emphasize that the D.C. National Guard’s command chain and the need for specific approvals created a situation where ROE were not uniformly defined on the ground and varied by unit and mission orders ^{[4] [3]}. That distinction clarifies why some Guard elements could perform perimeter security or traffic control, while others were not empowered to conduct arrests or crowd suppression without different orders.

3. The operational timeline that shaped ROE on January 6 — approvals, offers, and constraints

Multiple timelines compiled by investigators show that the Capitol Police did not request broad National Guard backup before the breach, despite military offers, and that formal approval for Guard deployment took more than an hour after the situation escalated, during which mission language and ROE were refined toward support tasks rather than proactive law enforcement. Acting Defense Department officials, including Christopher Miller, played central roles in the limited approvals, and internal directives emphasized support roles; Vice Presidential or congressional urgings helped trigger later authorization for clearance operations ^{[1] [2]}. The fragmented decision-making and the D.C. Guard’s special command status meant that initial orders were narrowly tailored, shaping ROE to focus on perimeter, traffic, and logistical support instead of immediate riot-control authority ^{[1] [7]}.

4. What happened after January 6 — extended deployments and mission creep in the capital

Post-January 6 policy choices extended Guard presence in Washington under varying authorities and missions that sometimes emphasized non-law-enforcement tasks such as grounds maintenance, security presence, and “beautification,” with orders extended into 2026 in at least one reporting sequence, and legal challenges surrounding these missions ^{[5] [6]}. Deployments under Title 32 in particular allowed Guard troops to perform some law-enforcement-adjacent tasks while remaining under local or governor-aligned control, and those arrangements explain why later missions differed materially from the January 6 posture in ROE and permitted activities ^{[3] [4]}. Public reporting and government communications reflect a shift from emergency rapid-response posture to longer-term, administratively managed missions that carried different ROE and public scrutiny.

5. Where facts diverge and why agendas matter — parsing competing explanations

Disputes center on whether delays and constrained ROE were the result of deliberate political decisions or bureaucratic process. Some actors emphasize presidential or Pentagon hesitancy to deploy robust Guard support; others point to statutory command channels and required approvals that legally limited immediate action. Both explanations find support in official timelines and after-action reviews: operational law and command protocols constrained options, while individual actors’ choices about how quickly to invoke those authorities and what mission language to use affected outcomes ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Advocacy groups, political offices, and congressional committees have advanced narratives that align with institutional or partisan agendas; the factual record shows a mix of legal constraint and decisionmaking that together produced the observed ROE.

6. Bottom line for readers — what the record actually says about ROE at the Capitol

The evidence shows that ROE for National Guard forces at the Capitol are not universal but contingent: they depend on activation authority, mission tailoring, and approval chains; on January 6, that resulted in Guard units authorized primarily for support, traffic, and perimeter functions rather than active law-enforcement suppression, contributing to operational delays and public controversy ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Subsequent extended deployments used different legal bases and missions, explaining changes in permissible actions and continuing debate over the appropriate scope of Guard roles in domestic security ^{[5] [6]}.