How would NATO’s European members fare against Russia without US logistical support?
Executive summary
Without sustained U.S. logistical and strategic enablers, European NATO members would still possess significant combat power on paper but would face critical gaps in force projection, sustainment and unified command that make meeting a large-scale Russian conventional attack far more difficult; closing those gaps is politically and financially possible but would require rapid, coordinated investment and time measured in years, not months [1] [2] [3].
1. The starting position: numbers, platforms and doctrine
Collectively Europe (including the UK) fields large and modern militaries and advanced air forces that on paper rival Russia in many domains, with a combined active force and high-end platforms produced by European industries, yet NATO’s wartime command architecture assumes U.S. leadership and integrated American capabilities as the backbone of alliance operations [3] [1] [4].
2. The single biggest loss: strategic enablers and logistics
The practical effect of losing U.S. logistical support would be a loss of strategic enablers — space and ISR, long-range precision strike, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling and integrated missile defence — capabilities that enable rapid deployment, sustainment and battlefield awareness; analysts and NATO officials point to especially large deficits in space-based ISR and strategic airlift compared with U.S. levels [1] [2] [5].
3. What that means on the battlefield: reach, tempo and attrition
European forces have strong combat units and capable airpower, but without U.S. sealift/airlift and refuelling they would struggle to marshal and sustain the volume of forces needed for high-tempo, expeditionary reinforcement or to regain control at sea and across the Baltic and Black Sea theaters — a shortfall that could allow Russia operational freedom of maneuver and prolong attritional combat to Europe’s disadvantage [6] [2] [7].
4. The command problem: unity, speed and credibility
NATO’s command presumes a U.S. Supreme Allied Commander and a tightly integrated transatlantic C2 rhythm; Europeans could retain existing NATO structures for a time, but realignment away from U.S.-led operational command would strain speed of decision-making and interoperability unless political choices are made to Europeanize command and rapidly habituate joint headquarters [3] [8] [5].
5. Time and money: how long and how costly is autonomy?
Studies and expert estimates suggest Europe could field most critical enablers within several years if member states accept large, sustained spending increases and industrial ramp-up — scenario analyses put investment needs in the hundreds of billions to generate credible forces for a high-end Article 5 contingency without U.S. backup [1] [2] [9].
6. Where Europe already has advantages and where it must be honest
European NATO’s air forces are relatively advanced and interoperable and Europe’s defense industries can produce modern systems, but airpower alone cannot substitute for sea control, strategic sustainment, or space-based ISR, and Europe remains short on ammunition production, large-scale unmanned fleets and the satellite mass that the U.S. fields [10] [2] [6].
7. Political constraints and asymmetric risks
Even with the money, political will is uneven across capitals; public opinion, domestic politics and diverging threat perceptions — west versus east Europe — make a rapid, unified rearmament politically fraught, while cyber and dual-use vulnerabilities, and potential Russian integration of cyber and kinetic tools, amplify Europe’s exposure absent U.S. resilience support [11] [6] [7].
8. Plausible outcomes and policy trade-offs
If the U.S. withdrew its logistical support suddenly, Europe would likely be able to mount a credible delayed defence but risk paralysis at the outset of a large Russian offensive; conversely, with years of focused spending, industrial mobilization and political integration (including options to “Europeanize” NATO command), Europe could build a credible autonomous deterrent — at significant cost and only if member states sustain the effort [8] [1] [9].
9. The politics behind the analysis
Reporting from think tanks and policy centres shows an implicit tension: calls for European strategic autonomy can be read as sincere security planning and as pressure-levers to prod Washington into continued engagement; some analysts warn Europe will still need at least limited U.S. cooperation during a transition, while others argue long-term autonomy serves both sides if pursued prudently [8] [1] [12].