Which neighboring countries have conducted operations or intelligence activities at or around Bagram since U.S. withdrawal?
Executive summary
Neighboring countries most frequently named in reporting as having taken an interest in Bagram since the U.S. withdrawal are China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asian states — primarily through diplomatic, intelligence contacts and regional forums opposing a U.S. re‑entry [1] [2] [3] [4]. Independent confirmation of on‑the‑ground operations by these states at Bagram is inconsistent: multiple outlets report alleged U.S. landings and secret visits there, while Taliban spokesmen denied any foreign military presence and some reporting remains unverified [5] [2] [1].
1. The contested narrative: who is said to have been at Bagram
Since 2025 several news and opinion pieces alleged visits or activity at Bagram involving U.S. intelligence aircraft and personnel; scattered reports also claim Chinese and Iranian intelligence or IRGC delegations rushed to Kabul to meet Taliban security officials — but these accounts are often based on single outlets or unconfirmed sources [5] [2] [1]. Other analyses and commentaries highlight Beijing, Tehran and Moscow as major regional players watching any change at Bagram because its reactivation would alter intelligence collection dynamics across Central and South Asia [4] [6].
2. What reporters actually confirmed: strong signals, weak verification
Multiple outlets reported a U.S. C‑17 or transport landing and the presence of senior CIA figures at or flying to Bagram — stories that prompted follow‑up coverage and regional diplomacy — yet these reports lacked independent corroboration and were publicly disputed by Taliban spokesmen who insisted no U.S. presence exists on Afghan soil [5] [2] [1]. In short: media accounts describe activity; authoritative confirmation on exactly who operated at Bagram after 2021 is absent or contradictory in the available reporting [5] [2].
3. China and Iran: rushed envoys and geopolitical interest
Several opinion and local reports say Chinese Ministry of State Security and Iranian IRGC officials engaged Taliban counterparts in Kabul amid the Bagram claims, suggesting both capitals moved fast to protect influence and counterbalance any U.S. comeback [1]. Strategic analysts argue both Beijing and Tehran would see a revived intelligence or surveillance foothold at Bagram as directly relevant to monitoring Xinjiang, Belt‑and‑Road routes or Persian‑Gulf‑regional calculations [6] [4]. Available sources do not provide independently verifiable proof that either China or Iran established permanent operations at Bagram [1] [6].
4. Pakistan and Russia: regional balancing and diplomatic signals
Reporting and expert commentary frame Pakistan and Russia as key audiences and potential actors in any Bagram equation. Pakistan is repeatedly referenced in analyses of logistics or flight routes, and Moscow has led “Moscow Format” consultations that produced a joint regional statement opposing foreign military re‑deployments to Bagram — an explicit collective diplomatic signal against new U.S. basing [2] [3]. Those regional objections amount to political moves and public posture rather than documented intelligence operations on the base itself [3].
5. Central Asian states and India: worried watchers, not proven operators
Central Asian countries show up in multilateral statements and policy pieces as opposed to renewed external military footprints in Afghanistan; India has been named in rumours about involvement at Bagram but Kabul denied any Indian presence, and such claims were dismissed by Afghan officials in reporting [3] [7]. The sources indicate diplomatic resistance and concern more than verified operational activity on the airfield [7].
6. Why reporting varies: motives and information gaps
Discrepancies in coverage reflect competing agendas: outlets sympathetic to U.S. intelligence narratives stress an American return for counterterrorism; Taliban statements and regional diplomacy push back; opinion pieces from regional actors warn of renewed proxy rivalry — each has implicit aims to shape perceptions about sovereignty, influence, or security [2] [1] [3]. Open reporting gaps and reliance on single sources make firm attribution of post‑withdrawal operations at Bagram unreliable in current material [5].
7. Bottom line and what remains unknown
Available reporting names China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Central Asian states as active stakeholders — some portrayed as sending intelligence delegations, others using diplomatic forums to block a U.S. return — but none of the provided sources offers independent, conclusive evidence that those neighbours have conducted sustained on‑base operations at Bagram after the 2021 U.S. withdrawal [1] [2] [3]. Not found in current reporting: verified, on‑the‑ground, long‑term operations run by those neighbouring states at Bagram; the picture remains a mix of high‑level visits, unconfirmed flights and regional diplomacy [5] [2].
Limitations: this analysis relies solely on the supplied articles, which include news reports, opinion pieces and some unverified claims; where sources conflict I have outlined competing views and noted when independent corroboration is missing [5] [2] [3].