How do rules of engagement and presidential authorities apply to counter-narcotics strikes?
Executive summary
The U.S. has escalated military action against Latin American drug groups—designating some as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and authorizing Pentagon strikes in foreign territory or international waters—which critics say shifted engagement from law enforcement to battlefield tactics and led to multiple missile strikes killing scores [1] [2] [3]. Legal and policy debates center on whether FTO designation, an unpublished presidential order authorizing military force, and Pentagon/JSRO rules provide lawful authority for lethal counter‑narcotics strikes; many experts and foreign governments argue those steps do not alone justify use of force under international law [1] [2] [4].
1. A new playbook: counter‑terrorism tools used for drug interdiction
The administration’s decision to label groups such as Tren de Aragua as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and to authorize strikes marks a tactical shift: measures and language once reserved for ideologically driven terrorism are being applied to profit‑motivated criminal networks, which expands domestic authorities available to the U.S. government and lets military targeting practices enter what had largely been a law‑enforcement realm [1] [5].
2. Presidential authority and an unpublished order
Reporting indicates an unpublished presidential order from August 2025 authorized the Pentagon to use military force, in foreign territory or international waters, against designated cartels—an assertion central to critics’ legal concerns because it substitutes presidential direction for traditional maritime law enforcement led by the Coast Guard [2] [4].
3. Rules of engagement: battlefield logic vs. law enforcement restraint
Multiple analysts warn that treating cartel vessels as wartime targets lowers thresholds for lethal force by invoking battlefield logic rather than due‑process law enforcement approaches; the designation and operational posture effectively bring the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual and the Joint Chiefs’ Standing Rules into play, even though counter‑drug ROE language remains at least partially classified [1] [6] [7].
4. International law and the self‑defence problem
Scholars emphasize that FTO listing broadens domestic tools but “does not itself provide a licence to use force under international law.” Any claim of self‑defence to justify unilateral strikes requires demonstration of imminent danger—reporting says that showing imminence or an armed conflict with these groups has not been established, leaving the legal basis tenuous in public sources [1] [2].
5. Operational consequences and institutional friction
Shifting the mission to the military has consequences: lawmakers, veteran practitioners and U.S. agencies tied to maritime interdiction express alarm that missile strikes—and a new joint task force under II MEF—may undercut long‑standing Coast Guard‑led interdiction, hamper evidence collection for prosecutions, and strain bilateral cooperation with partners like Colombia and Mexico [4] [3] [8].
6. Policy defenders argue for necessity and precedent
Some defense commentators note historical patterns where novel uses of force began as controversial and later gained acceptance if states demonstrate necessity, proportionality, transparency and restraint; they argue that if the U.S. can meet those standards, expanded military measures against trafficking might become an accepted practice [9].
7. Regional and reputational fallout
Foreign governments and multilateral voices have pushed back: France said the attacks “disregard international law,” Colombia’s president called certain strikes a “crime against humanity,” and analysts warn the campaign risks eroding 35 years of counter‑drug relationships in the hemisphere—potentially reducing intelligence and operational cooperation that has been central to interdiction successes [3].
8. Accountability, transparency and the evidence gap
Critics point to a persistent lack of publicly disclosed evidence: officials have not detailed what evidence tied targeted vessels to trafficking, what munitions were used, or how many drugs were onboard—an opacity that fuels legal critiques and diplomatic objections and complicates internal oversight [4] [6].
9. Stakes and competing pathways forward
The debate reduces to tradeoffs: proponents argue robust military tools can deter and disrupt trafficking networks; opponents caution that militarization without clear international law justification, transparency, or partner buy‑in risks illegality, mission creep, and regional backlash. Current reporting documents both positions but indicates significant unresolved legal and policy questions remain [9] [1] [2].
Limitations: available sources do not provide full text of the presidential order, and key counter‑drug ROE language is classified, so public analysis relies on government statements, investigative reporting, and legal commentary cited above [2] [6].