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How have recent defense contracts or export deals (post‑2020) priced missile packages bundled with Gripen purchases?
Executive summary
Recent post‑2020 Gripen deals that include weapons or missile packages show wide variation in disclosure and pricing detail: Thailand’s 2025 four‑jet order was reported as SEK 5.3 billion for the whole package (aircraft plus weapons/support) [1] [2], and Sweden’s internal procurement and weapons projects cite specific missile programme values such as a SKr3.2 billion project to equip Gripen E with an extended‑range RBS15 (announced 2019 but reported alongside later procurement threads) [3]. Public reporting on other export negotiations (Canada, Colombia, Ukraine) either lists total contract values for airframes and broad packages (Colombia ~€3.1bn / $3.62bn for 17 jets) or explicitly notes weapons are purchased separately — meaning missile‑bundle pricing is often implicit, not itemised [4] [5] [6].
1. What we actually see in published contracts: whole‑package numbers, not line‑item missile prices
Where media and officials disclose deal values after 2020, they almost always publish aggregate package costs that bundle aircraft, training, support, spares and often weapons — not a per‑missile or per‑missile‑package line item. Examples: Sweden’s sale to Thailand was reported as SEK 5.3 billion for four Gripen E/F aircraft and associated package [1] [2]. Colombia’s 2025 contract announcement gave a headline value of about €3.1 billion ($3.62bn) for 17 aircraft and a “host of equipment and weapons” [4] [5]. These figures establish that weapon systems are part of packages but do not reveal how much of the headline price is missiles versus airframes or services [1] [4].
2. When missile programmes are priced separately, they can still be large and treated as national projects
Some missile or weapons programmes tied to Gripen are funded and announced separately from export contracts and have standalone budgets in public reporting. For instance, Sweden’s project to fit Gripen E with an extended‑range RBS15 was reported with a project value of SKr 3.2 billion (reported in 2019 coverage but relevant to later Gripen weapons integration discussions) [3]. Saab’s work developing decoy missiles and electronic attack pods for HX/Finnish offers was publicised as part of competitive bids — again signalling that weapons development and integration are budgeted and sold as discrete capability packages, even when export contracts do not break down costs publicly [7] [8].
3. Multiple reporting practices create ambiguity about “missile bundle” pricing
Journalistic and official coverage shows two competing practices: (A) aggregate deal disclosure — governments or manufacturers publish a single headline value covering aircraft plus weapons and services (Thailand, Colombia) [1] [4]; (B) capability‑project disclosure — separate press releases or procurement documents announce missile programmes, upgrades or missile orders with their own budgets (RBS15 project, Meteor procurements) [3] [9]. This split means analysts cannot reliably extract a per‑airframe missile‑package price from public sources in most cases [3] [1].
4. Where reporting does mention weapons explicitly, it often stresses “weapons bought separately”
Several sources caution that weapons are often procured or licensed separately from the jets, or that contracts “do not include weapons” unless specified. Coverage of potential large export scenarios (e.g., Ukraine’s LOI for 100–150 Gripens) repeatedly notes that weapons procurement is a distinct and complex issue and may be constrained by third‑party export controls (U.S. engines/components) and financing — underscoring that missile packages may not be embedded in a simple aircraft unit price [10] [11].
5. Political and industrial levers shape whether missile costs are visible
Governments and manufacturers use offsets, industrial participation, technology transfers and financing packages to make deals palatable; that practice can hide the granular cost of missiles inside wider cooperation agreements. For example, Colombia’s deal included offset commitments and industrial‑social cooperation elements alongside the headline price [12] [13]. Sweden’s and Saab’s public messaging around offers (e.g., Canada, Ukraine) emphasises support, production scale‑up and financing rather than per‑weapon accounting [14] [15].
6. Bottom line and limitations
Available sources document several aggregate post‑2020 deals and separate weapons programmes tied to Gripen but do not provide systematic, itemised pricing for “missile packages” bundled with aircraft across transactions. Where a single price exists for a transaction (Thailand, Colombia), it covers the entire package and does not break out the missile component; where missiles are priced separately, they appear in different procurement streams [1] [4] [3]. Therefore, precise per‑missile‑bundle pricing post‑2020 is not reliably extractable from the cited reporting [1] [4] [3].
If you want, I can: (a) compile every reported headline deal post‑2020 and annotate whether weapons are itemised in the reporting; or (b) track specific missile types (Meteor, RBS15, Taurus, KEPD‑350, LADM) and the public budgets or contracts that mention them. Which would be more useful?