Which radar frequency bands (L, S, C, X, Ku, K) most affect detectability of Gripen E compared to F-35A during beyond-visual-range engagements?
Executive summary
Radar frequency band matters because different bands interact with aircraft shapes and materials in distinct ways; available reporting says the Gripen E is not stealth-designed but has a smaller radar cross section than most fighters except the F‑35 and F‑22 [1]. Sources emphasize sensor fusion, AESA radars and EW suites as decisive in BVR detectability—not a single frequency band alone [2] [3].
1. Frequency bands change the physics — but reporting focuses elsewhere
In principle lower-frequency bands (L, S) illuminate larger structural features and can reduce the effectiveness of small-scale shaping and RAM (radar‑absorbent material) intended for X/Ku/K bands, while higher bands (X, Ku, K) respond strongly to fine-edge shaping and surface treatments; however, the sources in this packet do not provide measured RCS versus band curves for the Gripen E or F‑35A, and so do not quantify which bands “most affect” detectability (available sources do not mention band‑by‑band RCS data).
2. Gripen E: reduced RCS but not stealth — context from Saab and reporting
Multiple sources and analyses make the consistent point that the Gripen E is not a stealth aircraft in the 5th‑generation sense but that it has a smaller radar cross‑section than most legacy fighters, trailing only the F‑35 and F‑22 in operational fleets according to one defence magazine [1]. Wikipedia and industry writeups note the Gripen E’s new AESA radar and upgraded electronic warfare systems as core improvements rather than a full stealth redesign [4].
3. F‑35A: designed around low observability across typical X‑band threats — source gap
Public commentary treats the F‑35 as purpose‑built for low observability, with shape and materials optimized against the sort of X‑band airborne fire‑control radars common in BVR engagements. The supplied materials assert the F‑35’s stealth advantage compared with Gripen E [1] [5]. Precise, comparable laboratory or field RCS figures by band for the F‑35A are not present in the provided sources (available sources do not mention RCS measurements by frequency band).
4. AESA, LPI and sensor fusion matter more in practice than single‑band physics
Long pieces on platform comparisons stress that modern BVR outcomes hinge on electronics: AESA radars, low‑probability‑of‑intercept (LPI) modes, datalinked sensor fusion, and EW systems. Hush‑Kit and related analyses emphasise sensor fusion and datalinking as tactical multipliers for the Gripen E; forum discussion likewise flags LPI and multi‑frequency tactics as complicating passive detection [2] [3] [6]. That means even if a radar band is in principle better at detecting certain shaping, the practical detectability in BVR is shaped by tactics and integrated sensors.
5. Practical tactical tradeoffs by band (what analysts implicitly assume)
From the commentary in these pieces, analysts imply these tradeoffs: L/S bands can detect “non‑stealth” features at longer ranges against flush‑shaped stealth treatments but suffer lower resolution for precise targeting; X/Ku/K bands provide higher resolution and are typical for fire‑control radars, where the F‑35’s shaping and RAM are optimized to be weakest. The sources discuss these tradeoffs generically but do not offer hard empirical comparisons for Gripen E vs F‑35A per band (available sources do not mention empirical per‑band comparisons).
6. Electronic warfare and RWR complicate any simple band answer
Forum and analytic commentary stress that RWRs, EW suites and LPI modes can hide which band is being used or blunt detection windows; one forum post notes an RWR can often only give bearing and band information and that LPI schemes can make attribution and ranging difficult at long range [6]. Both platforms rely heavily on electronic measures: Gripen’s modern EW and the F‑35’s integration of emission control and stealth form overlapping, competitive approaches [4] [2].
7. What you can and cannot conclude from these sources
You can conclude that: (a) Gripen E is not stealth‑designed but has a notably reduced RCS versus typical 4th‑gen types [1]; (b) F‑35A is treated as the benchmark for low observability [1] [5]; and (c) sensor fusion, AESA radars and EW largely determine BVR detectability [2] [3]. You cannot, from these sources, conclude which specific bands (L, S, C, X, Ku, K) give a decisive detection advantage for one platform over the other because no per‑band, empirical RCS or engagement‑model data are provided (available sources do not mention per‑band RCS engagement data).
8. Bottom line for analysts and planners
For procurement or mission planning, treat frequency band as one factor among many. The reporting here recommends focusing on the radar type (AESA vs legacy), LPI/LPD tactics, EW capability and sensor‑fusion architecture rather than expecting a single band to flip detectability in BVR combat [2] [3]. If you need a definitive band‑level assessment, current reporting in this packet cannot supply it — you will need classified test data or published lab measurements not contained in these sources (available sources do not mention such test data).