What specific regional conflicts are most likely to escalate into wider wars by 2035?
Executive summary
A handful of regional conflicts—Russia’s war in Ukraine and potential Russia–NATO direct clashes, cross‑Taiwan Strait tensions tied to China and the U.S., a widening Israel–Iran proxy confrontation across the Levant and Red Sea, Horn of Africa fragmentation centered on Ethiopia/Eritrea and the Red Sea, and spillovers in the Great Lakes (DRC/Rwanda)—carry the clearest risk of expanding into wider wars by 2035 based on current trajectories and expert forecasts [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].
1. Russia–Ukraine as the single most dangerous tinderbox — direct NATO involvement remains the critical escalation vector
Experts surveyed by the Atlantic Council judged a direct Russia–NATO clash a rapidly rising risk, with 45 percent expecting a direct military conflict within ten years and 69 percent of those expecting any future great‑power war naming a Russia–NATO encounter as the likely flashpoint [1]. The Stimson analysis underlines the durability of conventional wars like Russia–Ukraine, noting such wars typically last a decade and that Russia’s position grows stronger after three years, making negotiated settlement unlikely without major shifts [2]. That combination—long war, escalating attrition, and alliance commitments—creates the clearest pathway from a regional war to a multi‑front great‑power confrontation [1] [2].
2. China–Taiwan and maritime flashpoints — persistent gray‑zone pressure with unpredictable escalation potential
Analysts argue Beijing’s coercion around Taiwan and in the South and East China Seas has so far been mostly gray‑zone rather than full‑scale invasion, but the structural alignment into China‑ and US‑led blocs flagged by foresight respondents increases systemic risk if a Taiwan crisis forces alliance commitments [2] [1]. The Atlantic Council’s respondents foresaw bloc formation by 2035 including prospective alignments [1], and the Stimson brief warns that economic decoupling and coercion can indirectly magnify military tensions, so a Taiwan contingency remains a plausible trigger for wider confrontation despite current limits on Beijing’s escalation [2] [1].
3. Israel–Iran and the Levant — proxy wars, Houthis, and the Red Sea as escalation multipliers
The Israel–Gaza war produced cross‑regional knock‑on effects: Houthi strikes on shipping and expanded Iranian arms flows have already widened the battlefield into the Red Sea and threatened global commerce [3]. Crisis Group highlights how Iranian proxy networks, Houthi retaliation, and Israel’s strikes on regional targets can cascade if one party expands operations or is directly struck; experts caution that renewed Israeli strikes against Iran or Yemeni territory could draw in external powers [3]. The Atlantic Council also flagged broader Middle East dynamics as key drivers of bloc alignments that could amplify local wars into larger contests [1].
4. Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor — state fragility meets geostrategic competition
The Tigray conflict’s aftermath, Eritrea–Ethiopia tensions, and competing external patrons have left the Horn volatile; Vision of Humanity and CrisisWatch document simmering border disputes and renewed local armed actions that threaten cross‑border spillover as Ethiopia seeks Red Sea access [4] [5]. The Red Sea’s strategic chokepoints and greater powers’ interest in maritime security and transit could convert localized Horn instability into wider regional intervention, especially if non‑state actors (Houthis, Al‑Shabaab) link with state proxies [4] [3].
5. Great Lakes and Sahel spillovers — enduring local wars with regional contagion potential
The DR Congo’s eastern provinces, where foreign troop involvement and rebel networks persist, remain prone to rapid escalation; CrisisWatch warns that agreements lacking enforcement and exclusion of armed groups are unlikely to halt violence, while ACLED and Vision of Humanity document chronic instability across fragile states where conflicts rarely end decisively [5] [6] [4]. Such protracted, multiparty conflicts can draw in neighbors and external patrons, creating a regionalized conflict that, while not immediately a great‑power war, could destabilize entire corridors and invite outside military interventions [5] [4].
Caveats, competing views, and implicit agendas
Surveys and trackers reflect expert judgment and incident data but carry biases: foresight polls (Atlantic Council) project perceptions of bloc formation that may reflect respondents’ threat priors, and trackers emphasize current hotspots without reliably predicting sudden political shifts or deterrence effects [1] [5]. Some sources (Stimson) argue Beijing’s actions are likely to remain below invasion thresholds, a counterpoint to worst‑case Taiwan scenarios [2]. Reporting from conflict trackers also cannot predict the impact of future diplomacy, leadership change, or technological deterrents; these unknowns limit confident forecasting beyond identifying the most plausible escalation pathways [2] [5].