Under what rules of engagement can the US Coast Guard or Navy use force against suspected narco-boats?
Executive summary
U.S. Coast Guard counter‑drug missions normally operate under domestic law enforcement authorities and a graduated interdiction playbook that authorizes warning shots, disabling fire and, when necessary, deadly force in self‑defense; the service reported nearly 510,000 pounds of cocaine seized in FY2025 and has used precision disabling fire to stop “go‑fast” boats [1] [2]. The Biden/Trump-era military strikes on suspected “narco‑boats” have sparked a legal debate: Pentagon law‑of‑war doctrine and some legal analysts say survivors and disabled vessels are protected and lethal attacks must be justified by self‑defense or an armed‑conflict predicate, while the administration has argued a narco‑terrorism framing permits military targeting [3] [4] [5].
1. Law enforcement at sea: the Coast Guard’s playbook for interdiction
The Coast Guard frames most maritime counter‑drug work as law enforcement under Title 14 authorities, using a step‑by‑step interdiction process that includes pursuit, warning, disabling fire to the vessel or engine, boarding, seizure and detainment — and an immediate switch to search‑and‑rescue if people enter the water — with TACLET and HITRON teams trained to shoot out engines while avoiding harm to non‑combatants [1] [6] [7].
2. When force escalates: law enforcement versus armed conflict
Under the Coast Guard’s law‑enforcement model, force against suspected smugglers is permitted when necessary to stop a vessel or to protect personnel; but once a boat is disabled and no longer a threat, crews are expected to move to rescue or detainment rather than kill survivors [3] [1]. Independent commentators and legal reviews stress that killing shipwrecked or otherwise hors de combat persons would violate the Pentagon’s Law of War manual and customary protections for survivors [8] [3].
3. The administration’s “narco‑terrorist” justification and its critics
The Trump administration designated certain trafficking groups as terrorist organizations and has publicly described strikes as operations against “narco‑terrorists,” a framing it says supports lethal targeting at sea; officials have defended strikes as self‑defense against a narcotics threat to the homeland [9] [2]. Critics — including maritime law experts and commentators at Just Security and War on the Rocks — say that labeling traffickers “unlawful combatants” or equating drug flows to armed attack stretches the law of armed conflict and does not displace ordinary maritime interdiction rules that constrain lethal force [4] [10].
4. Rules of engagement, commander authority and standing guidance
U.S. forces operate under Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and service‑level ROE and handbooks (Navy/Marine/Coast Guard Commander’s Handbook) that limit lethal force to self‑defense and mission‑authorized actions; those documents specify when warning shots and disabling fire are appropriate but make lethal targeting contingent on a unit’s defense and higher‑level legal authority [4] [11]. International ROE handbooks and Sanremo guidance likewise emphasize proportionality, hot‑pursuit limits and the primacy of life‑saving obligations at sea [12] [13].
5. Recent practice: disabling fire vs. kinetic strikes that kill
Public reporting and military statements show two distinct practices in 2025: Coast Guard interdictions using helicopter snipers to disable engines and then detaining crews, producing large seizures (including a 20,000+ lb haul), and separate U.S. military “precision strikes” that destroyed small vessels and killed people — the latter prompted intense legal scrutiny and congressional questions about targeting lists and orders from senior officials [2] [14] [15] [16].
6. Legal red flags and competing legal views
Multiple outlets and experts warn that (a) killing persons who are no longer an active threat or who are shipwrecked can violate the law of armed conflict and be a war crime; (b) the AUMF or self‑defense doctrines have unclear applicability to drug cartels; and (c) established maritime narcotics conventions and interdiction frameworks exist that do not require lethal strikes — creating a legal fault line between enforcement‑first advocates and proponents of military targeting [3] [5] [17] [4].
7. Political and operational consequences
The strikes have led to diplomatic friction with regional partners, Congressional war‑powers pushback, and calls for investigations; supporters argue the campaign disrupts cartel revenue and protects American communities, while opponents say it risks unlawful killings, undermines cooperative interdiction frameworks, and may provoke trafficking groups to adapt their tactics [9] [18] [17] [16].
Limitations and missing items
Available sources do not mention a single, publicly released, legally binding written ROE specific to these 2025 strikes; they do, however, cite existing SROE, service handbooks and the Coast Guard’s standard interdiction playbook as the operative frameworks [11] [1] [4]. Available sources do not provide the full classified legal memos or internal targeting lists referenced in briefings; those remain undisclosed in public reporting [16].
Bottom line
Coast Guard interdictions at sea follow a law‑enforcement escalation ladder that permits disabling fire and detention; lethal force at sea is legally constrained by SROE, the law of armed conflict and international interdiction norms. The administration’s use of military strikes under a “narco‑terrorist” rubric departs from traditional practice and has produced sharp legal disagreement over whether commanders lawfully may order lethal strikes against boat crews absent an armed‑conflict or clear self‑defense justification [1] [4] [10].