Russia and China's attempts to set up permanent military bases in Venezuela, which the US views as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Russia and China have deepened political, economic and military ties with Venezuela over decades, prompting U.S. warnings that greater foreign military footprints in Caracas would violate the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine; however, reporting indicates a gap between rhetoric and confirmed reality — strong diplomatic statements and past deployments exist, but clear evidence of new, permanent Russian or Chinese bases in Venezuela is not established in the available sources [1] [2] [3]. Analysts and governments are debating whether symbolic support, military sales and occasional deployments amount to a strategic foothold that Washington will treat as intolerable [4] [2].
1. Historical ties, arms sales and intermittent deployments
Moscow and Beijing cultivated Caracas under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro through trade, loans, arms sales and exercises that created a long-standing relationship: Venezuela has bought Russian aircraft and rifles, hosted joint exercises and maintained embassies with both powers, demonstrating a pattern of military cooperation that could be used as a baseline for deeper access [1] [4].
2. Rhetoric versus documented bases: what the sources actually say
Public condemnations and diplomatic support for Maduro from Russia and China were immediate after the U.S. strikes, with both capitals denouncing U.S. action and calling for UN engagement, but most reporting finds their backing largely symbolic in the face of U.S. force projection — BBC reporting cites experts saying concrete military or financial aid prospects were limited and that backing had “largely dried up” [5] [2] [6]. Wikipedia and other background pieces document prior Russian deployments and military sales to Venezuela, but the sources do not provide incontrovertible evidence in this reporting set of newly established, permanent Russian or Chinese bases on Venezuelan soil as of early January 2026 [1] [2].
3. Why Washington views any foreign foothold as a Monroe Doctrine issue
U.S. officials and commentators frame potential Russian or Chinese military access to Venezuela through the lens of hemispheric security and the Monroe Doctrine’s legacy, treating any sustained presence by great-power militaries in Latin America as a strategic challenge to U.S. primacy — a concern amplified in commentary that emphasizes how a perceived foreign base would change the regional balance and provoke a robust American response [7] [8]. The Atlantic and AEI pieces reflect debate in the U.S. policy community about legitimacy and proportionality even as policymakers warn against foreign military entrenchment near U.S. shores [9] [7].
4. Intentions, options and limits for Russia and China
Beijing and Moscow have incentives — energy access, political influence, strategic signaling — to seek deeper ties with Caracas, and U.S. security planners say China has “likely considered” Caribbean basing options in wider Pentagon assessments, but analysts caution that logistical, diplomatic and cost constraints limit how far Russia or China can convert goodwill into permanent overseas bases in Venezuela, especially under intense U.S. pressure [3] [4] [2]. Reporting notes past incidents of Russian aircraft and equipment deliveries and mentions promises of support, yet also emphasizes that much of this has been political posturing rather than establishment of enduring military infrastructure [1] [2].
5. Near-term implications and contests over narrative
In the short term the dispute is as much about narrative and deterrence as about physical bases: Washington uses the Monroe Doctrine framing to delegitimize third-party influence and justify strong countermeasures, while Russia and China invoke sovereignty and international law to condemn U.S. actions — a rhetorical tug-of-war that could still translate into escalatory steps if either Moscow or Beijing seeks more visible military access and Washington responds, but present reporting suggests the situation is fluid and contested rather than settled [10] [9] [8] [6].