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Russia is sending it's troops in big quantity just to die, this is an intimidation technique
Executive summary
Available reporting shows very high Russian personnel losses in 2024–2025 and multiple expert assessments that large volumes of Russian troops have been committed despite heavy casualties — figures range from hundreds of thousands of total casualties to over one million depending on the tracker or intelligence quoted (examples: BBC/aggregate mid‑Nov. 2025 estimate 226,541–327,226 KIA for Russian servicemen and contractors [1]; Mediazona/Meduza officer and overall tallies in 2025 point to massive losses [2] [3]; and Western/trackers and Ukrainian tallies report total Russian combat losses exceeding one million by late 2025) [2] [1] [3]. Coverage does not directly demonstrate that Moscow’s sending of large numbers of troops is primarily an “intimidation technique” rather than operational necessity or failure — available sources do not mention that Moscow’s intent is solely to intimidate civilians or foreign audiences.
1. Russian losses are very large; sources disagree on scale
Multiple outlets and trackers document extremely heavy Russian personnel losses but disagree on totals: Mediazona/Media projects document thousands of confirmed officer deaths and region-by-region tallies (5,943 officers confirmed as of Nov. 7, 2025) [2]; Meduza/Mediazona analysts estimate between 200,000–220,000 Russian dead by mid‑2025 [3]; UK/British intelligence and other Western sources are cited by analysts placing total Russian casualties at or over one million by mid/late‑2025 [1] [4]. Independent trackers and Ukrainian state aggregators report totals above one million as well, with daily updates and equipment loss tallies [5] [6]. These divergent totals reflect methodological differences and political stakes in casualty accounting [1] [3].
2. Operational patterns: mass assaults have produced high casualty rates
Reporting by the Institute for the Study of War and battlefield assessments show Russian assaults in certain sectors produce very high casualty rates and units rendered combat‑ineffective after heavy losses (for example, elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade were reported “combat ineffective” after heavy personnel losses) [7]. ISW and Ukrainian sources document repeated high‑intensity assaults that incur steep personnel and equipment attrition [7]. This pattern is consistent with accounts that Russia continues to commit large formations even when losses are severe [7] [8].
3. Explanations offered by analysts: manpower shortfalls, strategic necessity, and political pressure
Analysts cited in CSIS and other think tanks describe Russian behavior as driven by battlefield underperformance, slow gains, and high attrition, leading to continuing mass commitments that some analysts call evidence of “blatant disregard for soldiers” and predict catastrophic cumulative casualties (CSIS projected up to 1 million casualties by summer 2025) [8]. Other reporting highlights legal and institutional changes — e.g., laws on training and deploying reservists without geographic restriction — that enable larger flows of personnel to the front, suggesting organizational drivers rather than purely performative aims [9].
4. The “intimidation” hypothesis: what sources say and what they don’t
None of the provided sources frame Russia’s injection of troops principally as a deliberate intimidation technique intended to sacrifice forces to terrorize Ukrainians or external audiences. Instead, reporting emphasizes battlefield dynamics (heavy assaults, attrition), manpower mobilization and legal changes, and political calculus at home [7] [9] [8]. Therefore, the claim that Moscow is sending “troops in big quantity just to die” as an intimidation tactic is not substantiated in the cited reporting; available sources do not mention that specific intent.
5. Competing viewpoints and implicit agendas in the sources
Ukrainian government and state‑linked tallies (e.g., “I Want to Live” or state press summaries) tend to report very high cumulative Russian casualties (well over one million), reflecting Kyiv’s incentive to highlight Russian losses [10] [6]. Independent Russian‑language outlets (Meduza, Mediazona) use demographic and registry methods to estimate deaths and emphasize officer losses [2] [3]. Western think tanks and intelligence summaries (CSIS, BBC citations, British estimates) provide high estimates and interpret Russian tactics as costly and inefficient [8] [1]. Each actor has institutional perspectives — Ukrainian sources emphasize Russian attrition to bolster domestic and allied support; independent media focus on verification; Western analysts emphasize strategic implications [10] [3] [8].
6. What the evidence supports and where uncertainty remains
Evidence supports that Russia has sustained extremely high casualties and continues to commit large formations that suffer steep losses; battlefield reporting documents units rendered ineffective and heavy concentration of casualties in certain assaults [7] [2]. What is not shown in the provided reporting is an explicit Kremlin policy of deploying troops primarily to die as an intimidation tactic — that causal intent is not found in current reporting (available sources do not mention that Moscow’s intent is solely intimidation). Large discrepancies in casualty tallies and methodological differences across trackers mean precise counts and the interpretation of motive remain contested [1] [3].
7. Bottom line for readers
The weight of open reporting portrays massive Russian manpower commitments and heavy losses driven by battlefield operations, organizational choices, and political imperatives; the assertion that troops are being sacrificed principally as an intimidation technique lacks explicit support in the sources provided and remains an interpretive claim rather than a documented Kremlin policy (p1_s3; [8]; available sources do not mention the specific intimidation intent).