Fact check: How does the loss of refineries impact Russia's military fuel supplies?

1. Why refinery losses matter — a fuel system under stress

Refineries convert crude into usable military fuels such as diesel and aviation gasoline; when 11–17% of refining capacity is taken offline, as various analyses reported, the immediate effect is fewer finished fuel products entering domestic supply chains, elevating prices and causing rationing at retail stations ^{[3] [2]}. The outages described in September 2025 included partial and full shutdowns of large facilities — including units at major Rosneft refineries and Kirishi — that together represented a substantial share of regional output, disrupting established flows from refineries to military depots and private pumps alike ^{[1] [4]}. These disruptions translate into increased reliance on remaining refineries, emergency imports or redirected exports, and heightened logistical complexity for military fuel managers.

2. What the numbers show — scale and timing of capacity lost

Reporting places the capacity lost in a band: near 10% in some accounts, and up to 17% in others for August 2025, with independent analysts estimating 11–14% broadly offline at points in late September ^{[1] [2] [3]}. Several sources tie the acute shortage to a cluster of drone strikes that temporarily sidelined key units for a month or more, with repair estimates generally around weeks to a month for many damaged units, while larger reconstructions could take longer ^[1]. The variance between 10% and 17% stems from timing (immediate post-strike vs. continued attrition through September) and which units are counted as fully offline versus partially operating ^{[2] [4]}.

3. Immediate civilian-impact evidence — shortages, rationing and prices

By mid-to-late September 2025, reporting documented gasoline shortages in 20-plus Russian regions, closure of small independent stations, and widespread rationing, with A-92 and A-95 prices rising 40–50% year-to-date in some measures, prompting state interventions to stabilize supply ^{[5] [6]}. These civilian market effects demonstrate the transmission from refinery outages to ground-level availability; small retailers without integrated supply chains were hit hardest, reducing the overall resilience of the domestic distribution network and complicating prioritized deliveries to strategic customers, including military units ^{[2] [1]}. Government measures included redistribution and regulatory steps, but those address symptoms rather than instantly restoring refining throughput ^[6].

4. Military-specific vulnerabilities — logistics, prioritization and stockpiles

Armed forces rely on steady pipelines and depot networks; sudden refinery outages create downstream bottlenecks even where national-level stockpiles exist, because fuel distribution depends on tank truck capacity, available terminal throughput, and regional refinery output. The strikes targeted nodes tied to strategic distribution corridors, forcing Russia to reroute supplies, increase crude exports to maintain revenue, and shift refined product flows — moves that can delay deliveries to front-line units and training activities ^{[1] [3]}. Prioritization policies can mitigate front-line shortfalls, but evidence of retail rationing and regional disruptions shows these mitigation options were strained in September 2025 ^[5].

5. How Russia can respond — repair, reroute and export trades

Russian responses documented in September 2025 included accelerated repairs, tactical stockpile releases, and logistical rerouting, alongside attempts to sustain export revenues by increasing crude flows from western ports while constrained refining capacity lowered domestic product availability ^[1]. Analysts note repairs to many damaged units could be completed in weeks, restoring some capacity, but sustained pressure or further attacks would lengthen recovery. These measures reduce but do not eliminate military risk: short-term prioritization can keep critical platforms fueled, but prolonged refining constraints increase the risk of training reductions or local operational pauses where fuel allocation is contested ^{[3] [6]}.

6. Diverging assessments — severity, duration and strategic intent

Sources converge that the strikes materially affected capacity, but they diverge on lasting strategic outcome: some portray the losses as a corrosive but repairable shock ^{[1] [4]}, while others emphasize structural weaknesses in Russia’s refining footprint that make longer-term fuel fragility likely if attacks continue ^{[3] [2]}. These differences reflect agendas: domestic reportage stresses recovery and countermeasures, independent outlets highlight systemic vulnerabilities, and external analysts quantify structural exposure. The practical effect is that Russia’s military fuel vulnerability is significant and time-sensitive, contingent on repair speed, operational security of logistics, and continued targeting.

7. Bottom line for military operations — constrained but not collapsed

Taken together, the evidence from August–September 2025 indicates refinery losses have constrained Russia’s military fuel supply chains, causing regional shortages, rising prices, and added logistical strain that can and did force prioritization of scarce volumes ^{[5] [6] [2]}. However, the outages did not eliminate Russia’s ability to fuel major platforms nationwide immediately; rather they increased fragility — the military can sustain operations if repairs proceed and redistribution continues, but prolonged or repeated attacks threaten cumulative effects that could significantly degrade readiness over months ^{[1] [3]}.