Fact check: 4 years ago Russia was considered the 2nd most powerful nation and a near peer of the USA militarily.

1. What people mean when they say “2nd most powerful” — a dangerous shortcut

Observers often conflate different measures—nuclear arsenal, conventional forces, manpower, defense spending, industrial base—into a single “power” label, which produces misleading conclusions. The 2023 IISS snapshot highlights large manpower and ICBM counts for Russia, including 1,190,000 active personnel and 339 ICBM launchers, while noting a defense budget far below U.S. levels ($66.4 billion) ^[1]. Other analysts argued that Russia’s economic constraints and lower defense spending make it a lesser power in sustained conventional competition, with nuclear forces being the primary basis for strategic weight rather than full-spectrum parity ^[2]. These divergent metrics explain why some considered Russia highly powerful but not a true U.S. near-peer.

2. Pre-2022/early-2024 evidence that supported high rankings for Russia

Assessments around 2022–2023 framed Russia as a top-tier military actor based on nuclear deterrent, size of armed forces, and strategic weapons inventories, which contributed to perceptions of being the world’s second-most-powerful military actor ^[1]. The Russia–U.S. comparisons compiled through 2023 and early 2024 emphasized quantitative strengths—missiles, subs, and manpower—that sustain a narrative of global military relevance even if conventional spending and economic outputs trailed the United States ^{[3] [1]}. Thus, prior to the full unfolding of the Ukraine war’s effects, credible institutes reported metrics that could be cited to justify a “second” ranking in certain dimensions.

3. Contradicting assessments that downranked Russia on structural grounds

Several commentators contemporaneously challenged the idea of Russia as a U.S. near-peer by pointing to economic weakness, lower industrial base, and limited defense expenditure, arguing Russia relied heavily on nuclear inheritances for status rather than broad-spectrum parity ^[2]. Those analyses warned that raw weapon counts or manpower did not reflect sustainment, logistics, or economic resilience needed for protracted high-intensity conflict. The implication is clear: while Russia could project strategic deterrence, it did not possess equivalent power projection or economic depth to be reliably ranked as second in an all-domain sense.

4. The Ukraine war’s impact: battlefield losses and the question of rebuilding

Subsequent reporting and later assessments document significant Russian losses in personnel and equipment during the Ukraine campaign, prompting reconstruction plans and changes to force posture ^[4]. Those losses undermine pre-war metrics that supported top-two characterizations, particularly in conventional capabilities. At the same time, exercises and deployments—such as drills with Belarus and tactical nuclear signaling—highlight attempts to preserve strategic weight and deterrence. These competing trends show that post-2022 events weakened the case for Russia as a near-peer in conventional terms while preserving its strategic nuclear significance ^{[4] [5]}.

5. Mixed indicators in 2024–2025: displays of strength amid strategic strain

Reporting from 2024–2025 points to both demonstrations of conventional and nuclear capability and growing strains: large-scale drills and deployments to Belarus signaled continued force projection, whereas ongoing rebuilding and attrition emphasize erosion of capability ^[5]. The 2024 comparison dataset referenced alongside 2023 metrics could provide updated balance-of-power insight, but the supplied summary lacks detailed figures; nevertheless, the pattern is consistent with a power in transition—maintaining some strategic levers while suffering conventional attrition ^{[3] [5]}. This mixed picture undermines a simple “second-most-powerful” verdict.

6. What the available evidence means for the original claim today

Given the evidence, the original statement is overly categorical: Russia was unquestionably a major military power with significant nuclear forces and large manpower that justified top-tier status in some rankings, but multiple contemporaneous assessments and later battlefield losses show it was not a full-spectrum near-peer to the United States ^{[1] [2] [4]}. The most defensible conclusion is that Russia occupied a distinct great-power position rooted in nuclear and regional capabilities, yet lacked the economic depth, defense spending parity, and resilient conventional superiority that would make it an unequivocal second to the United States across all metrics.

7. Bottom line and caveats for future claims

Any claim that “four years ago Russia was the 2nd most powerful nation and a near peer of the USA” must specify metrics—nuclear stockpiles vs. conventional sustainability vs. economic capacity—and account for wartime attrition and rebuilding. The provided sources show legitimate grounds for both affirming Russia’s major-power status and disputing near-peer equivalence; reconciling those views requires disaggregated measures and attention to events after 2021 that substantially altered the balance ^{[1] [2] [4] [5]}. Future statements should anchor rankings to explicit indicators and dates rather than broad labels.