What is the composition (T‑72, T‑80, T‑90, Western models) of Russia's and Ukraine's current tank fleets?
Executive summary
Russia’s fleet is dominated by three modernized Soviet-designed families—T-72B3 variants, T-80BVM, and the newer T-90M/T-90M2—with open-source analysis estimating these deep-upgrade types make up roughly 65–70% of Russia’s MBT force [1]. Ukraine’s inventory remains a mix of its indigenous T-64 family, older T-72s and T-80s, and a smaller number of Western-supplied and domestically modernized types such as the T-84 Oplot, with long-standing shortages and attrition shaping its composition [2] [3].
1. Russia: three families dominate, with production tilt toward T‑90M
Multiple OSINT and industry analyses describe Russia’s post-2022 tank fleet as concentrated in three upgraded lines: the T-72B3 family, the T-80BVM, and the T-90M (including the new T-90M2/Ryvok-1 variant), with Janes estimating these ‘deep-upgrade’ and latest models account for some 65–70% of Russian MBTs [1]. Leaked industry planning published by Frontelligence and summarized by ISW suggests Russian industry aims to modernize and produce large numbers of T-90M/T-90M2 and T-72B3M vehicles between 2026 and 2036—figures described as aspirational but indicating a clear industrial focus on the T-90 family and T-72 upgrades [4] [5]. Independent reporting notes sharply increased T-90M production rates in 2024–25 relative to pre-war levels, though at least one analyst cautioned that not all newly produced T-90Ms are necessarily deployed to Ukraine [4] [6].
2. Ukraine: T‑64s, legacy T‑72/T‑80s and a handful of Western or domestic modern types
Ukraine entered the conflict with a heterogeneous fleet that included large numbers of its indigenous T-64 variants (notably T-64BM/Bulat), T-80s inherited from the Soviet era, T-72 variants, and smaller numbers of Ukrainian-designed T-84 Oplot tanks; sources note Ukraine had roughly 800 active T-64s before the full-scale invasion and historically retained a significant T-72 inventory as well [2] [3]. Combat attrition, capture of Russian vehicles, and Western donations have altered the balance on the ground—open-source loss trackers and reporting document heavy Ukrainian and Russian losses and captured exchanges that complicate exact counts, but the qualitative picture remains a mixed legacy fleet reinforced by limited modern types [7] [2].
3. Direction of change: modernization, refurbishment and production limits
Both sides have relied heavily on refurbishing Soviet-era hulls: Russia has run significant upgrade programs (T-72B3M, T-80BVM) while ramping T-90 production ambitions; analysts stress production constraints and the practical reliance on overhauls to sustain numbers [1] [5] [4]. The IISS and other analysts warned that refurbishing stockpiles cannot offset losses indefinitely and that Russia faces a potential crunch in MBT availability if operational losses remain high, even as industry planning targets thousands of modernized tanks over a decade [8] [5]. Ukraine’s pool of T-64s and other legacy types is finite and has been depleted over time, forcing reliance on captured vehicles, Western armor donations, and modernization programs [3] [7].
4. Numbers are contested and context matters
Quantitative tallies differ across sources: open-source loss trackers report thousands of Russian tank losses since 2022 [7], while leaked industrial plans project production of over 2,000 modernized T-90/T-72 vehicles between 2026–2036 [4] [5]. Analysts (Janes, ISW, Frontelligence, IISS) explicitly caution that production targets are aspirational, counting methodologies vary, and official claims or milblogger assertions about output can diverge from independent estimates—so composition should be read as dominant types and trends rather than precise inventories [1] [5] [4] [8].
5. Why composition matters: operational effect and future risk
The shift toward T-90M and deep-upgrade T-72/T-80 families reflects Russian intent to prioritize survivable, modernized MBTs for future operations, but industrial limits mean quantity and sustainment remain pressure points; analysts warn this dynamic constrains Moscow’s ability to mass armored offensives over time [1] [8]. For Ukraine, preserving a mixed fleet—T-64s for numbers and locally familiar systems alongside Western-supplied or captured tanks—has been a pragmatic response to attrition but leaves capability gaps that hinge on continued external support and the capture/repair of enemy vehicles [3] [7].