How do troop strength, casualties, and equipment losses compare for Russia and Ukraine now?

Checked on December 21, 2025
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Executive summary

Russia currently fields larger authorized troop numbers than Ukraine and continues to pour manpower into the front, but it is suffering disproportionately high casualties and equipment attrition that erode combat power; independent analyses estimate Russia’s casualties at roughly one million (including up to ~250,000 killed) while Ukrainian casualties are substantially lower though still heavy, in the hundreds of thousands range [1] [2] [3]. Equipment losses favor Ukraine in the exchange ratio—analysts report Russian armored and tracked-vehicle losses far above Ukrainian losses since 2024, producing a sustained erosion of Russian armored formations [4] [1].

1. Force size and mobilization: Russia’s numerical edge, but with caveats

On paper and in authorized strength near the front, Russia outnumbers Ukraine by roughly a third and has continued to recruit and contract tens of thousands of personnel through 2025 to sustain operations, including foreign contingents reported in late 2024 and 2025; yet authorized figures do not equate to effective, combat-ready strength because of training shortfalls and personnel quality problems highlighted in multiple reports [5] [6] [7]. Moscow’s recruitment and contract claims—such as hundreds of thousands of personnel signed to contracts in 2025—are offset by reported monthly attrition rates and indicators that replacement flows do not fully make up battlefield losses, leaving Russia dependent on low-quality reinforcements and foreign fighters to plug gaps [7] [5].

2. Casualties: scale, uncertainty, and independent tallies

Independent estimates and investigative tallies place Russian casualties far higher than official Russian disclosures: CSIS and other studies estimate roughly one million Russian casualties (killed and wounded) since 2022 with deaths in the low-to-mid hundreds of thousands, while Ukrainian casualties are typically estimated in the several-hundred-thousand range, producing combined troop casualties approaching 1.3–1.4 million in some analyses [1] [3] [2]. Open-source tallies produced by Ukrainian and independent outlets produce much larger raw Russian death counts (into the hundreds of thousands) and media trackers like Mediazona and Meduza corroborate very heavy Russian officer and enlisted losses, but exact numbers remain contested and dependent on methodology [8] [5].

3. Equipment losses: Russia’s disproportionate attrition

Since January 2024, detailed equipment tallies show Russia losing large numbers of armored systems—examples include roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, around 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self‑propelled guns, and 1,865 tanks in one analytical accounting—producing equipment‑loss ratios often in Ukraine’s favor between roughly 5:1 and 2:1 depending on category and period [4]. Multiple independent Western assessments and press studies underscore that Russia has traded vast quantities of materiel for limited territorial gains, a dynamic that challenges Moscow’s ability to form high‑quality armored formations and sustain heavy offensives without renewed external production or imports [4] [1].

4. Combat effectiveness: loss of quality and operational consequences

High Russian losses in trained personnel and experienced officers, together with massive equipment attrition, have degraded Russian force quality even where Russia retains a numerical advantage; analysts note a de‑evolution in tactics, frequent use of massed infantry and undertrained reinforcements, and heavy reliance on attrition tactics that yield incremental ground for high cost [9] [7]. Ukraine’s forces, while numerically smaller and facing ammunition and infantry shortages at times, have leveraged Western systems, drones, intelligence, and defensive depth to blunt Russian advances and inflict outsized losses—sustaining battlefield effectiveness even as Ukraine absorbs significant casualties [3] [6].

5. What the numbers mean: strategic balance and uncertainty

The aggregate picture is of a war of attrition in which Russia holds a quantitative edge in personnel but pays a disproportionately high price in deaths, casualties, and lost armor—trends that weaken its capacity to achieve decisive breakthroughs absent major shifts in replenishment or external support—while Ukraine’s smaller force has inflicted heavy losses and preserved defensive resilience but remains vulnerable to manpower and munitions shortfalls [1] [4] [3]. Crucially, all specific totals remain subject to methodology, source bias, and reporting limitations: independent tallies differ widely from official statements, and open-source counts likely undercount or lag in different directions, so headline numbers should be read as best estimates rather than precise censuses [8] [5].

Want to dive deeper?
How have equipment-loss ratios between Russia and Ukraine changed month-by-month since January 2024?
What methodologies do CSIS, IISS, and Mediazona use to estimate casualties and equipment losses, and how do their results differ?
How do manpower replacement rates and recruitment policies in Russia and Ukraine affect future battlefield sustainability?