What role do state adjutants general and military orders play in authorizing arrests by the Guard?
Executive summary
State adjutants general (TAGs) are senior military officers who command a state’s National Guard and other state military forces and serve under the governor; they do not command civilian police forces [1] [2]. State statutes and executive direction define their duties and emergency authorities — for example, Arizona law makes the adjutant general the state military chief of staff and ties many responsibilities to the governor’s instructions [3]. Available sources do not mention specific legal authority for TAGs to unilaterally order arrests by civilian police. (If you are asking about military arrests or use of the Guard to detain people, current reporting in the provided sources does not address that question directly.)
1. Who the adjutant general is — the governor’s senior military officer
Every state (and many territories) has an adjutant general responsible for the state’s military forces, including the National Guard; federal law requires an adjutant general in each jurisdiction and positions the office as the primary military link between state and federal systems [2]. Encyclopedic summaries and state sites frame the role as administrative and military: TAGs oversee training, readiness and administration of state military forces [4] [5]. The Adjutants General Association and National Guard press describe TAGs as representing both state and federal equities — a dual-hatted role that answers to governors while coordinating with the Pentagon [6].
2. What TAGs can and cannot control — military authority, not police authority
The conventional distinction in the sources is clear: adjutants general exercise command over military forces, not civilian police. Wikipedia’s summary unambiguously states TAGs “do not have authority over police forces, only military forces” [1]. State statutes echo that the adjutant general’s portfolio is military and emergency-management-centered; Arizona statute gives the adjutant general authority as the military chief of staff and responsibility for emergency activities “subject to the approval of the adjutant general,” but it does not purport to give TAGs general police powers [3].
3. Arrests: where the sources are silent or indirect
None of the supplied materials describe a statutory power allowing adjutants general to authorize civilian arrests or to direct local police to arrest specific individuals. The Arizona adjutant general statute enumerates administrative, training and emergency roles but does not create independent civil arrest authority [3]. Likewise, federal law establishing adjutants general focuses on reporting relationships and the existence of the office rather than conferring police powers [2]. Thus, available sources do not mention TAGs’ capacity to authorize arrests by civilian law enforcement.
4. Military orders, detention, and the National Guard: implied constraints
Because TAGs command military forces, they can direct Guard troops when those forces are lawfully activated under state or federal authority [1] [2]. That command could, in theory, include military detention procedures applicable to service members or detainees taken by military personnel; however, the provided sources do not explain detention rules, military criminal jurisdiction, or how Guard roles intersect with civilian arrest authority. In short: the sources establish military command but do not explain any legal mechanism that converts that command into the power to order civilian arrests [1] [2].
5. Where arrests by federal agents or delegations complicate matters
The supplied material on federal delegations (ICE’s 287(g) program) shows another axis of authority: federal agencies can authorize state or local officers to perform certain immigration enforcement tasks under memoranda of agreement [7]. That example demonstrates how arrest authority can be expanded by federal-state arrangements, but the ICE example is agency-specific and does not involve adjutants general or National Guard command [7]. Available sources do not describe similar programs where TAGs or the Guard receive delegated civilian arrest powers.
6. Competing perspectives and legal friction — what the sources imply
One perspective in the sources is institutional separation: TAGs protect state military readiness and answer to governors while the civil policing sphere remains distinct [1] [4]. Another perspective, implicit in statutes like Arizona’s, is that TAGs have broad emergency-management responsibilities “subject to the approval” of state law and the governor; in emergencies governors can activate the Guard and that activation changes operational realities [3]. The tension lies in activation: when the governor lawfully employs the Guard for domestic operations, Guard personnel act under military command — but supplied sources do not assert that this transforms TAGs into civilian arrest authorities [3] [1].
Limitations: The set of provided sources does not contain statutes from every state, detailed legal analyses of military detention or Posse Comitatus implications, nor case law resolving conflicts between governors, TAGs and civilian law enforcement. Where the sources are silent, I have noted that absence rather than asserting a conclusion.