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What are the latest verified death toll figures from the Sudan civil war as of November 2025 and how reliable are the sources?
Executive summary
As of November 2025, publicly cited tallies for fatalities in Sudan’s civil war vary dramatically: several monitoring groups and studies record at least ~28,700 conflict deaths through late 2024 (with 7,500+ civilians among those) while multiple governments, media outlets and humanitarian bodies cite much higher aggregate figures — commonly “around 150,000” killed since April 2023 — and the UN documented 3,384 civilian deaths for Jan–Jun 2025 alone [1] [2] [3] [4]. Available sources show large gaps between documented counts (based on hospital, morgue, event data and field verification) and higher estimates that attempt to account for unrecorded violence, famine and disease; they also repeatedly warn the real toll is likely far higher than confirmed numbers [1] [5] [4].
1. What the conservative, documented counts say — “minimums” based on recorded events
Independent incident datasets and studies that rely on hospital, morgue and event-reporting methods have produced the most conservative, verifiable counts. For example, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and associated analyses recorded roughly 28,700 reported fatalities (including about 7,500 civilians) by late 2024; a satellite- and model-based research approach reached a similar “at least 28,700” figure for intentional injuries, explicitly excluding indirect deaths from malnutrition and disease [1] [2]. The UN Human Rights Office documented 3,384 civilian deaths between 1 January and 30 June 2025, and stressed that “the real toll is likely to be significantly higher” because of under‑reporting and limited access [4].
2. Why many reputable sources present much higher estimates (often ~150,000)
Higher headline figures — around 150,000 deaths — show up in multiple mainstream outlets, UN statements relayed by media, and summary assessments; these figures stem from triangulating partial reporting, modelling to account for unrecorded deaths, and extrapolations that attempt to include indirect mortality (disease, malnutrition, collapsed health systems). Outlets including ABC News and Vatican News cite “more than 150,000” or an “estimated 150,000,” and some senior diplomats and analysts have referenced similar upper-range estimates [3] [6]. Organizations and commentators urging urgent action argue that recorded numbers are large undercounts because more than 90% of deaths in some besieged areas went unrecorded, per field research noted in reporting [7].
3. The methodological divide: direct vs indirect deaths and undercounting
Sources diverge on scope and method. Event-based datasets count direct deaths from violent incidents that can be verified; they are conservative but reproducible [2]. Studies using satellite imagery, household surveys, health facility absence and statistical modelling attempt to capture indirect deaths — starvation, untreated disease, loss of chronic care — and to estimate what is missed by formal reporting; those outputs push totals far higher [1] [5] [7]. The UN’s Human Rights Office and fact-finding outputs combine documented killings with testimonies of summary executions and mass atrocities but still caution significant under-reporting [4].
4. Reliability assessment — strengths, weaknesses and political pressures
Event-based datasets (ACLED-style, hospital/morgue tallies) are the most verifiable and least prone to sensational inflation; their weakness is clear undercounting in active battlefields, sieges and displaced-population contexts [2]. Modelling and extrapolative studies try to correct for those blind spots but depend on assumptions about reporting rates and mortality multipliers; different assumptions produce widely different totals [1] [5]. UN and human-rights reports add credibility through field documentation and interviews but are limited by access constraints, security and the deliberate obstruction of investigators; the UN itself warns its documented casualties are a lower bound [4]. Political actors and some media outlets sometimes cite high-end estimates to spur action; those figures can reflect serious concern but are not always traceable to a single transparent methodology [3] [6].
5. What this means for readers and policy
The best-supported conclusion in available reporting is that confirmed, documented violent deaths number in the tens of thousands (conservative counts ~28,700 by late 2024) while many independent assessments, humanitarian agencies, and some governments believe the true toll — when counting indirect deaths and unrecorded killings — could be an order of magnitude higher, with frequent public references to ~150,000 [1] [2] [3]. All cited sources emphasize that the verified figures understate the human cost and that worsening displacement, famine risk and restricted access will push both direct and indirect deaths higher unless aid and protections improve [4] [8].
6. Bottom line and reporting caveat
Available sources do not converge on a single “verified” death toll as of November 2025; they present a defensible lower bound (tens of thousands documented) and credible higher-range estimates (commonly cited around 150,000) that reflect unrecorded violence and indirect mortality — but those higher figures lack uniform, publicly transparent methodologies across sources [1] [2] [3]. Readers and policymakers should treat conservative incident-based counts as minimum verified numbers, and interpret higher estimates as warnings that the crisis is substantially larger than official tallies indicate [4] [5].