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How many civilians are killed in Sudan compared to the number of combattants killed?
Executive summary
Available sources show widely varying estimates and severe data gaps: ACLED documents roughly 12,144 fatalities (combatants and civilians) between 1 Feb and 30 Nov 2024 (EUAA citing ACLED) [1], ACLED and partner counts since April 2023 report nearly 49,800 total deaths with almost 15,300 in attacks targeting civilians [2], and some studies and reviews place civilian deaths in the thousands — e.g., ACLED’s estimate of 7,500 civilians among ~28,700 “intentional injury” deaths (Science/AAAS) [3]. Reporting stresses undercounting and regional spikes (Khartoum, El Fasher, Darfur) and does not provide a consistent civilian-to-combatant kill ratio [4] [5].
1. What the headline numbers say — but why they don’t settle the question
Different trackers and reports give different totals: EUAA (using ACLED) reports 12,144 fatalities for Feb–Nov 2024 without separating combatant and civilian totals in that summary [1]; ACLED aggregated counts cited by media put nearly 49,800 total deaths since mid‑April 2023 with almost 15,300 deaths in attacks specifically targeting civilians [2]; a Science/AAAS summary notes ACLED estimated at least 28,700 deaths from “intentional injuries,” including 7,500 civilians [3]. These discrepancies reflect varying methodologies (time windows, inclusion of indirect deaths, and source selection) rather than a single authoritative tally [1] [3].
2. Why civilian and combatant tallies are especially unreliable in Sudan
Multiple reports flag severe undercounting and obstacles: the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) found up to 90% of fatalities went unrecorded in Khartoum State, and EUAA cautions that ACLED and other figures are likely underestimates [4] [1]. Warring parties restricting access, destruction of health and administrative systems, and mass displacement make casualty recording highly incomplete [3] [4].
3. Geographic and temporal concentration: civilians hit hardest in particular episodes
Sources document intense, focused civilian slaughter in specific places and months — for example, April offensives in North Darfur (at least 527 deaths with enormous losses in Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps) and an April market strike that reportedly killed at least 350 civilians (OHCHR) [6]. In late October 2025, reporting from Al Jazeera and others documents mass killings in El Fasher with claims ranging from “at least 1,500” to several thousand civilians [5]. These spikes mean civilian share of casualties can vary dramatically by month and location [6] [5].
4. Different definitions drive different civilian-combatant ratios
Some datasets count deaths “targeting civilians” separately from battlefield killings; others estimate “intentional injuries” or include indirect deaths from disease and starvation. ACLED’s datasets as used by different outlets yield different civilian counts — e.g., ~15,300 deaths in attacks targeting civilians across the conflict versus 7,500 civilians in a different ACLED tally of intentional injuries [2] [3]. Hence a single civilian-to-combatant ratio cannot be credibly extracted from available reporting [2] [3].
5. Alternative viewpoints and institutional caveats
Human-rights and humanitarian agencies (UN OHCHR, UN reporting cited by EUAA) emphasize widespread atrocities, summary executions and ethnic violence, implying a large civilian toll [6]. ACLED and academic studies warn of undercounting and model-driven revisions [1] [3]. Some local or government-affiliated sources give higher localized death counts (e.g., government-linked tallies for El Fasher) than NGO tallies, illustrating political and methodological divergence [5].
6. What we can and cannot say with confidence
We can say with confidence that: (a) thousands to potentially tens of thousands of people have died since the war intensified in April 2023; (b) civilians make up a substantial share of documented deaths and have been the primary victims in many mass‑casualty events [2] [3] [5]. We cannot produce a single, reliable nationwide civilian-versus-combatant kill ratio because available sources use different methods, time frames, definitions and each warns of undercounting [1] [4] [3].
7. How to interpret future figures and what to watch for
Watch for: datasets that explicitly separate direct combatant deaths, direct civilian targeting, and indirect deaths from famine/disease; transparency on methodology (time windows and source types); and independent epidemiological studies like the LSHTM’s capture–recapture work, which has highlighted major undercounting in Khartoum [4] [3]. Political actors’ tallies should be cross-checked against independent monitoring [5] [1].
Sources cited in this analysis include reporting and datasets from ACLED as summarized by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) [1] [4], UN OHCHR reporting [6], ACLED/NGO tallies cited by AFP/Al Arabiya [2], a Science/AAAS synthesis of modelling and satellite studies [3], and localized reporting on mass killings in El Fasher [5].