Total tonnage of bombs dropped o. Gaza

1. Conflicting tallies: small, mid and large estimates

Some sources and statements quoted by international bodies and monitors landed in the lower tens of thousands: the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor’s early-November estimate of 25,000 tonnes after 26 days appears in analysis cited by SGR and was repeated in other summaries ^[2], and UN committee reporting referenced “over 25,000 tons” dropped since early this year ^[5]. Other agencies and local Gaza offices produced higher cumulative numbers: multiple reports cite more than 65,000–70,000 tonnes by early 2024 or April 2024, a figure that is repeated across media and an aggregated encyclopedic entry ^{[8] [9] [7]}. Still other outlets or Gaza government statements have reported still larger totals—over 85,000 tonnes in November 2024 and figures of 100,000 tonnes or more in later summaries—showing a continuing upward revision as the campaign extended ^{[6] [3] [4]}.

2. Methodological differences drive discrepancies

Differences in totals reflect divergent methodologies and implicit agendas in the sources: some counts appear based on munitions/target tallies converted to assumed explosive mass (the EHRM/SGR discussion critiques some conversions as implying unusually large averages per target) while others aggregate reported strikes, media office tallies, and long-term cumulative estimates from Gaza authorities or environmental agencies ^{[2] [7] [6]}. Independent academic and NGO analyses that map specific weapon types—such as the FXB Center study documenting over one hundred 2,000 lb bombs in a defined period—provide concrete counts for certain munitions but do not by themselves produce a full war‑wide tonnage total ^[10].

3. Comparative language and its limits

Several reports frame totals by comparing them to historical bombings or to nuclear yields—examples include comparisons to World War II bombing of Dresden, Hamburg and London, or to the Hiroshima bomb—claims that appear in multiple sources but rely on converting explosive mass into broad equivalencies that can be rhetorically powerful yet imprecise ^{[2] [9] [7] [5]}. Those analogies are present in source material but rest on simplifying assumptions about explosive yield, distribution and destructive effect; the supplied reporting itself flags that some conversions (e.g., EHRM’s 25,000 tonnes ≈ two Hiroshima bombs) produce average-per-target numbers that other datasets find implausible ^[2].

4. What the supplied reporting cannot resolve

The assembled sources do not converge on a single, auditable total and do not publish a transparent, universally accepted methodology that reconciles counts of strikes, weapon types, and explosive yield across months of conflict; therefore it is not possible from these materials alone to assert a definitive final tonnage with forensic certainty ^{[2] [3] [5] [6]}. Some sources are explicit about provenance—UN statements and named monitors—while others originate with Gaza government offices or regional media and carry evident political contexts that can influence how cumulative figures are compiled and publicized ^{[5] [4] [8]}.

5. Best-supported summary and caveats

Taken together, the reporting supplied supports a bounded summary: multiple independent and institutional sources place total explosive tonnage in the multi‑ten‑thousands of tonnes, with recurring cited ranges roughly between ~25,000 tonnes (early estimates) and ~70,000–85,000 tonnes by various later dates, and with some local or partisan tallies claiming 100,000 tonnes or more as the campaign continued ^{[2] [5] [7] [6] [3]}. Any use of a single definitive number should be qualified: differences in counting methods, timeframes, and source incentives mean that precise aggregation requires access to raw strike logs, ordnance inventories and transparent conversion rules that the provided reporting does not collectively deliver ^{[10] [2]}.