Did the U.S. under Trump negotiate a withdrawal or peace deal with the Taliban?
Executive summary
The Trump administration negotiated and signed the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan — commonly called the U.S.–Taliban or Doha deal — on February 29, 2020; it set a 14-month, conditions-based timeline for withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces and required Taliban counter‑terror commitments, but it excluded the Afghan government [1] [2] [3]. Critics and U.S. defense officials say the deal effectively paved the way for a U.S. pullout that weakened Afghan forces and contributed to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover; supporters framed it as a path to end America’s longest war [4] [5] [6].
1. What the Trump administration actually signed: a withdrawal framework, not a comprehensive peace treaty
On Feb. 29, 2020 U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad and senior Taliban leaders signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha; the text commits the United States to a phased withdrawal of all U.S. and coalition forces within 14 months, conditioned on Taliban actions to prevent terrorist groups from operating from Afghan soil [1] [3] [2]. U.S. and NATO drawdown benchmarks and a prisoner-exchange were explicit parts of the pact, but the accord was not a final political settlement for Afghanistan’s government or governance [1] [3].
2. The Afghan government was excluded — a major political omission
The deal was negotiated between the U.S. and the Taliban and “did not involve the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” a point repeatedly noted by legal and journalistic accounts; intra‑Afghan talks were envisioned afterward, but Kabul was not a signatory to the February agreement [1] [3] [7]. That exclusion created immediate implementation friction — notably over prisoner releases and the sequencing of ceasefires [1] [3].
3. Terms: conditional withdrawal tied to counter‑terror commitments
The agreement tied the U.S. drawdown to Taliban guarantees — chiefly that Afghan territory not be used by groups such as al‑Qaida to threaten the United States and its allies — and specified troop‑level reductions (e.g., near-term reduction to 8,600 troops then full withdrawal within 14 months) [5] [2] [3]. Observers described those counterterror commitments as the “absolute minimum” for such a deal [8].
4. Views from supporters and critics at the time
The Trump White House and some supporters presented the Doha deal as delivering on a core campaign promise to end “endless wars” and provide a timetable for U.S. exit [5]. Critics called it a retreat that granted the Taliban concrete gains — immediate allied withdrawal and release of thousands of Taliban prisoners — and warned it risked strengthening the insurgency and undermining Afghan government forces [6] [9].
5. Retrospective assessments: did the deal cause the collapse?
Multiple post‑withdrawal assessments by U.S. defense officials and analysts trace the rapid Taliban collapse of the Afghan government in 2021 in part to the Doha deal’s effects: setting a withdrawal date, reducing air strikes, and altering Afghan force posture that, officials say, strengthened Taliban offensives [4] [10]. Scholarship and legal commentary also argue the agreement facilitated a structured U.S. exit that ultimately failed to secure long‑term stability [11] [12].
6. What the agreement was not: a final peace settlement or intra‑Afghan resolution
Scholars emphasize the February accord was a bilateral U.S.–Taliban arrangement to manage withdrawal and start intra‑Afghan negotiations, not a comprehensive peace that resolved Afghanistan’s governance, rights, or legitimacy questions; those wider political settlements were left to future talks that proved fragile [7] [11].
7. Remaining disagreements in sources and limits of reporting
Sources agree the U.S. signed the Doha deal and committed to withdrawal timelines [1] [3], but they diverge on interpretation: some view it as ending an unwinnable war [5], others as a premature surrender with predictable consequences for Afghan civilians and security [6] [4] [9]. Available sources do not mention detailed internal White House deliberations beyond what officials and congressional records released (not found in current reporting).
Bottom line: the Trump administration negotiated and signed a formal U.S.–Taliban agreement in February 2020 that explicitly set a timetable for U.S. withdrawal and required Taliban counter‑terror guarantees, but it was not a comprehensive peace deal that included the Afghan government — and post‑hoc analysis from U.S. officials and scholars links the agreement to the conditions that enabled the Taliban’s rapid return to power in 2021 [1] [2] [4].