The UAE armed the RSF and that the ICJ dismissed Sudan’s genocide case on jurisdiction grounds

1. How the allegation that the UAE armed the RSF took shape

Sudan’s application to the ICJ charged that the UAE provided “extensive financial, political, and military support” to the RSF, enabling atrocities against the Masalit in West Darfur and amounting to complicity in genocide; Sudan sought provisional measures to force the UAE to stop any support and prevent further harm ^{[7] [8]}. That narrative is supported in reporting that points to evidence collected by human rights organizations, Conflict Observatory tracking of aircraft alleged to have carried UAE arms transfers, and findings that some U.S. lawmakers and UN experts found the claims credible — even as the April U.N. panel report mentioned in some coverage did not explicitly list the UAE as an arms supplier ^{[6] [5] [2]}.

2. UAE’s response: denial, jurisdictional defense and politics

The UAE answered the accusations with categorical denials, calling the filing politically motivated and arguing the ICJ lacked competence to hear the dispute; UAE officials framed Sudan’s case as a publicity stunt or a misuse of the court and urged judges to dismiss it on jurisdictional grounds ^{[9] [10]}. Diplomatically the UAE emphasized humanitarian commitments and neutrality in some statements while also using the legal tack of pointing to its reservation to the Genocide Convention’s Article IX — effectively a procedural shield that became decisive in The Hague ^{[6] [3]}.

3. Why the ICJ threw the case out — jurisdiction, reservations and judicial division

The ICJ concluded it “manifestly lacked” authority to proceed because the UAE had entered a reservation excluding ICJ jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention; judges also weighed whether Sudan had shown sufficient legal linkage that the UAE exercised effective control over the RSF, with the court noting limitations in the evidentiary record presented at this stage ^{[3] [1]}. The voting was sharply divided: a strong majority said the court had no jurisdiction on key questions while a narrower majority voted to remove the case from the list, underscoring deep judicial disagreement and leaving the underlying factual allegations unresolved ^{[2] [4]}.

4. What was proven, what was not, and the practical consequences

The ICJ decision is procedural — it does not adjudicate whether the UAE did or did not supply arms to the RSF; it only means the World Court will not resolve Sudan’s genocide claim against the UAE under the Genocide Convention because of the UAE’s reservation and jurisdictional bar ^{[1] [3]}. Independent reporting and advocacy groups continue to publish evidence and allegations that state or track transfers and weapons use in Sudan, and some legislators and experts found those claims credible, but the ICJ’s dismissal means those claims must be pursued through other forums, fact-finding mechanisms, criminal courts or diplomatic pressure rather than the Genocide Convention route in The Hague ^{[5] [6]}.

5. Competing narratives, hidden interests and next steps

Two clear narratives now compete: Sudan and allies who say the UAE materially fuelled RSF atrocities and must be held accountable, and the UAE which argues procedural mischief and denies wrongdoing; both sides have strategic incentives — Sudan to seek international leverage and the UAE to shield diplomatic and regional influence — while third-party actors (U.S. lawmakers, human rights NGOs, and UN monitors) provide corroborative or cautious perspectives that have not settled the dispute ^{[8] [5] [2]}. The practical consequence is a legal setback for Sudan’s chosen path, continued public scrutiny of alleged arms transfers, and an unsettled accountability gap that will likely shift advocacy toward sanctions, national prosecutions, further UN inquiries, or political pressure rather than an ICJ ruling on genocide ^{[4] [2]}.