What UCMJ articles apply to retirees and how has Supreme Court precedent interpreted them?

1. What the UCMJ says and which retirees are listed

Article 2 of the UCMJ, as implemented in 10 U.S.C. § 802, enumerates categories of persons subject to court-martial and has been interpreted by Congress and the services to include many kinds of retirees and retired-lists members — active-duty retirees, members on the Fleet Reserve/Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, and certain reserve/retainer-pay recipients — with specific subparagraphs such as what courts label Article 2(a), (a), and (a) implicated in disputes over reach and category ^{[1] [2] [5]}.

2. Longstanding judicial underpinning: Tyler and the historical line

The historical thread begins with nineteenth-century precedents like United States v. Tyler and continued lines of authority treating retirees who receive retirement or retainer pay as having a continued relationship with the military that justifies subjecting them to military law, a view relied upon in later statutory and judicial constructions of Article 2 ^{[6] [7]}.

3. Recent service-court jurisprudence: Dinger, Begani, and the CAAF posture

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and service courts have reaffirmed and in some instances extended military jurisdiction over retirees: CAAF decisions such as Begani and the earlier treatment of Dinger have upheld that retirees may be tried — and in Begani’s instance even face punitive discharges and loss of benefits — under existing readings of Article 2, while the military appellate system has rejected constitutional attacks to date ^{[2] [8]}.

4. The federal courts and the Larrabee challenge

Litigation in the federal courts picked up after Larrabee, where defendants challenged Article 2(a)’s reach for Fleet Marine Corps Reservists as beyond Congress’s Article I powers because such retirees are not part of the “land and naval forces”; a district court for the D.C. Circuit initially found the provision unconstitutional in one ruling, but the government appealed and appellate panels have largely sustained jurisdictional reach — the D.C. Circuit and other federal panels have at times disagreed and the case law remains fractured ^{[4] [9]}.

5. The Supreme Court’s role (or lack of one) and what denial of certiorari means

The Supreme Court has not issued a controlling opinion that squarely resolves the constitutionality question; instead, it has repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari in high-profile retiree cases such as Dinger and Larrabee, which leaves the statutory regime in place and lower-court precedent intact but does not create a new definitive national ruling from the high court ^{[3] [4] [9]}.

6. Scholarly and legislative friction: critiques, remedies, and rare enforcement

Critics — including scholars and some former judge advocates — argue that retirees lack the structural ties to maintain the unique purposes of military law (good order and discipline) and urge Congress to narrow or clarify Article 2 ^{[10] [11]}; defenders note that retiree jurisdiction is rarely exercised and that Congress has repeatedly endorsed the statutory framework, leaving potential reform to legislative action rather than judicial fiat ^{[1] [2]}.

7. Practical consequence: what this means on the ground

The practical reality is twofold: on paper, a broad set of UCMJ articles can apply to many categories of retirees under current statutes and service regulations; in practice, courts and military authorities exercise that power sparingly, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant review in pivotal cases has preserved the status quo while leaving constitutional challenges and doctrinal disagreements to percolate in lower courts and Congress ^{[1] [3] [8]}.